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Beyond Insolvency
Vincent S. J Buccola*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A common dynamic in contested Chapter 11 proceedings pits a
firm's shareholders against its creditors. Unable to pay debts as they
come due, the firm has petitioned for relief from creditors' immediate
attempts to levy on firm assets. The bankruptcy judge will decide how
best to reorganize the debtor firm. Shareholders argue that the firm
should continue operations and that it needs bankruptcy relief primarily
to restructure current debt burden. The firm will be profitable,
shareholders argue, and consequently they deserve to participate to some
extent in the restructured enterprise. The creditors see things differently.
The creditors argue that the firm's operations are inefficient, that the best
thing to do is liquidate assets, with proceeds going to satisfy debts before
shareholders take a dime. Shareholders and creditors have roughly equal
information about the firm's operations and prospects, yet they
systematically disagree about the prudent course of action. Shareholders
want to continue operations; creditors want to liquidate.
This dynamic is an example of a more general, persistent tension
between investors with hierarchically differentiated claims on a firm's
assets-what this Article calls "vertical investor conflict." In a firm with
a single class of investor (say, shareholders), the investors maximize the
value of their investment by maximizing the firm's expected
profitability. In choosing between two ventures, one risky and one safe,
the investors ask themselves only whether the risk associated with the
first project is offset by the returns it promises to generate if successful.
If the project is risk-justified, the investors want to pursue it; if not, they
want the firm to steer clear of the risk. In this way such a firm directs its
assets to the projects society values most highly-in expectation,
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anyway. Things become more complicated when a class of creditors is
introduced. The creditors, who have the right to be paid their debt but no
more, favor the steady course even if the risky one could pay off big.
Meanwhile the shareholders, who because of limited liability owe
creditors no personal obligation if the firm fails, favor the risky venture.
If the gamble pays off, the shareholders enjoy a sizeable return. If not,
they offload at least part of their losses on the creditors. Neither
shareholder nor creditor thinks the way a sole owner thinks. Vertical investor conflict is a chronic problem in modem business
organizations. Because the preferences of investors in a hierarchically
differentiated firm differ from those in an equity-only firm, the conflict
threatens to divert resources from their socially optimal use. What is less
clear is what, if anything, the law has to say about resolving these
conflicts. In general, a firm's managers are entrusted to decide how to
use its assets. The question this Article takes up is how, if at all, the law
should intervene when management's view of the best course appears to
be colored by investors' divergent preferences.
Courts that have addressed vertical investor conflict explicitly have
framed the problem as one of fiduciary obligation. Managers decide in
the first instance what to do, but they are obliged to decide in accordance
with their duty of loyalty. But loyalty to whom? Beginning with the
seminal case of Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications,' Delaware's
chancery and supreme courts have articulated a rule of corporate law
under which the direction of management's fiduciary duty of loyalty
depends on the firm's solvency. Managers of a solvent firm owe
obligations to shareholders only, not to creditors,2 but managers of an
insolvent firm or a firm "in the vicinity of insolvency" may be required
to take creditor as well as shareholder interests into account; they must
consider what is best for a "community of interests." As a matter of
fiduciary principles, in other words, managers of a solvent firm may-

1. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 1991
WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
2. See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stating that no fiduciary
duty is owed to creditors absent legislative action or expressly contracted indenture provisions).
3. CreditLyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155 n.55; see also Prod. Res. Grp., v. NCT Grp.,
863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that managers of a firm that is near insolvency may
be required to pursue a strategy that gives preference to neither stockholders nor creditors). But see
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007)
(holding that "no direct claim for breach of fiduciary duties may be asserted by the creditors of a
solvent corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency").
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indeed, must-prefer shareholders over creditors.
Managers of an
insolvent or nearly insolvent firm face a more diffuse and hence less
restrictive set of loyalties.
In the two decades since Credit Lyonnais, legal scholars have
devoted numerous papers to critiquing this duty-shifting regime.
Commentators have variously argued that managerial loyalty should run
exclusively in favor of shareholders; 6 that it should run in favor of
creditors;7 that loyalty requires managers to act for a hypothetical, sole
investor;8 and that judicially enforceable fiduciary obligations should be
abolished altogether.9 Scholarly opinions vary, but they share the
common assumption that, as a doctrinal matter, the duty of loyalty
embodies the norms by which business managers are expected to resolve
vertical investor conflict. Scholarly debate has in other words turned on
the way courts articulate, or should articulate, fiduciary standards.
Another common thread runs through the existing literature. In
general, scholars have devoted little attention to how the fiduciary ideals
they promote can be enforced in a world where the business judgment
rule looms large.o Ideals are well and good for managers who seek to
4. The focus here is Delaware corporate law because of its pervasive influence on questions
of corporate governance. Some states have declared by statute that managers may take the interests
of non-shareholder constituencies into account. In Oregon, for example, directors evaluating a
tender offer may "give due consideration to the social, legal and economic effects on employees,
customers and suppliers of the corporation and on the communities and geographical locations in
which the corporation and its subsidiaries operate . . . ." OR. REV. STAT. §60.357(5) (2003).
5. In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the obligation to creditors identified
in Credit Lyonnais does not imply a cause of action for breach of the duty of loyalty. 930 A.2d at
99-101. The duty to creditors serves, in other words, as a shield to protect managers from liability
to shareholders but not as a sword for creditors to assert wrongdoing.
6. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1446-47 (1993) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Defense]; Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the CorporateDuty
to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1402-03 (2007)
7. Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 456
(1986) [hereinafter McDaniel, Corporate Governance]; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205,313-15 (1988) [hereinafter McDaniel, Stockholders].
8. Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for CorporateLaw: A NeotraditionalInterpretation
of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MiCH. L. REV. 214, 268 (1999); see also Laura Lin, Shift of FiduciaryDuty
upon CorporateInsolvency: Proper Scope ofDirectors' Duty to Creditors,46 VAND. L. REv. 1485,
1524 (1993) (arguing that an asset-value-maximization norm is efficient but that creditors should be
required to bargain for explicit contractual rights rather than benefit from a freestanding fiduciary
obligation).
9. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309,
1315 (2008).
10. Lin, supra note 8, at 1506-07, is a notable exception. Lin posits that "[e]xtending the
business judgment rule to shield the directors' business decisions when they are challenged by
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fulfill their legal obligations whatever the practical consequences. They
may even exert important expressive power." To the self-interested
manager, however, they have little to say. To the self-interested
manager, a robust business judgment rule looks scarcely different from a
world in which fiduciary obligations are formally defunct. The question
of deference must be central to any practical criticism of existing
doctrine, and in this sense the literature has failed to engage with perhaps
the most important consequence of Credit Lyonnais and its ilk. On its
face, Credit Lyonnais appeared to reduce managerial discretion by
creating a previously unknown duty of loyalty to creditors. But it did so
by adding a new class of beneficiaries-namely creditors-to the
fiduciary fold. The decision thus charged managers with caring for a
diffuse "community of interests" comprising shareholders as well as
creditors, no one member of which has any particular claim of right.12
With no metric by which to judge a manager's success or failure, the
effect of Delaware's jurisprudence since Credit Lyonnais therefore may
have been to insulate management decision-making through an
expansion of the business judgment rule's domain.
This Article argues that scholarly debate over vertical investor
conflict (and Delaware case law in particular) has missed the mark.
First, on the question of ideals, this Article challenges the unanimous
assumption that fiduciary duty holds the doctrinal key to vertical investor
conflict. Preoccupation with the role of fiduciary duty might be
attributable to myopia inherent in the discrete jurisdictions of the courts
and, to a lesser degree, of the academy. Courts accustomed to hearing
equitable claims may find it natural to frame problems in terms of

creditors can alleviate th[e] concern for potential abuse." Id. The business judgment rule says that
courts will not second-guess a disinterested manager's good-faith decisions made with due care.
E.g., In re Citigroup S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (stating that the
business judgment rule "prevents judicial second guessing of the decision if the directors employed a
rational process and considered all material information reasonably available"). It is a rule of
deference, albeit one with play in the joints. For example, the concept of due care has proved elastic
in the hands of a suspicious court. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871 (Del. 1985)
(reversing the chancery court's application of the business judgment rule even though the directors
claimed to be "well-informed").
11. See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of Directors' Duties to
Creditors, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 224, 228 (2007) (exploring the "expressive holdings" of
judges who suggest that corporate directors owe creditors fiduciary duties during periods of financial
distress, yet who refuse to formally hold so).
12. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 1991
WL 277613, 1156 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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fiduciary obligation-an example of Kaplan's law of the instrument. 13
Whatever the reason, courts and commentators have paid insufficient
attention to the ways in which general debtor-creditor law aims to
influence corporate management in the ordinary course. This Article
argues as a descriptive matter that longstanding fraudulent transfer
principles point toward an existing norm of asset-value maximization.
For five hundred years, fraudulent transfer law has prohibited debtors
from intentionally "delaying, hindering, or defrauding" creditors. 14 This
Article offers a theory of fraudulent transfer which, in combination with
a traditional, shareholder-focused conception of fiduciary duty, describes
a norm under which a manager should seek to maximize the expected
value of her firm's assets. On this theory, in other words, a manager can
simultaneously satisfy her duty of loyalty to shareholders and the firm's
obligations to creditors only by seeking to maximize the firm's expected
value to investors as a whole."
Proponents of a value-maximization norm are on sure footing as a
descriptive matter. The critical question becomes one of institutional
competence. As a realistic matter, that is, one has to ask to what extent
asset-value maximization is an enforceable norm and not just a piece of
wishful thinking. In doctrinal terms the question is how robustly courts
ought to interpret rules of deference to management.16 Decisions such as
Credit .Lyonnais and Gheewalla suggest that, from Delaware's
perspective, at least, judicial second-guessing is a nonstarter.17 This
13. Abraham Kaplan describes the "law of the instrument" as: "Give a small boy a hammer,
and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding." ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE
CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 28 (Transaction Publishers, 4th

prtg., 2004) (1964).
14. The formulation dates to Queen Elizabeth's reign. 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 5 (Eng.).
15. Others have argued that a rule of asset-value maximization is economically rational. See,
e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 214-18; Lin, supra note 8, at 1497; see also Baird & Henderson, supra
note 9, at 1313 (describing this view as dominant among economists and legal scholars influenced
by economic theory). Some courts have found a corresponding norm in the federal law applicable to
debtors in bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 841 F.2d 732, 734-75 (7th Cir. 1987).
16. When shareholders allege breach of fiduciary duty, the rule of deference is the business
judgment rule. In re Citigroup S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009). When
creditors allege fraudulent transfer, there is a corresponding principle of deference-namely, the
requirement that the creditor prove bad intent. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1304 (2012)
(prohibiting transfers made by a debtor "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor
of the debtor").
17. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at * 1143 (Del. Ch. 1991) ("I do not conclude
lightly or easily that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was violated here. The entire course
of conduct of defendant . . . does, however, force me to that conclusion."); N. Am. Catholic Educ.
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) ("Delaware courts have
traditionally been reluctant to expand existing fiduciary duties.").
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Article argues that the degree to which courts defer to managerial
decisions should depend on the quality of market signals available. For
firms with widely traded securities, the Article shows how capital
markets can give teeth to an asset-value-maximization norm within the
framework of existing causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and
fraudulent transfer. By observing changes in the market prices of a
firm's securities after management has announced a strategic plan, courts
can learn valuable information, at low cost, about whether a manager has
(or has not) deviated from the law's ideal. The threat of accurate and
inexpensive litigation can be expected in turn to improve managerial
discipline. Litigation holds less promise of identifying wrongdoing in
the case of closely held firms, and consequently judicial deference
should be at its maximum when investors in close firms challenge
managerial decisions. And yet, this Article argues, the close firm is not a
hopeless case. It is in precisely the close context where, because of low
transaction costs, managers are most likely to maximize asset value
without legal intervention.
But this anticipates too much. Before we can hope to judge the
utility of particular rules we must understand more fully the dynamic that
generates vertical investor conflict and the ways in which managers can
be expected to resolve it absent legal intervention. Although the basic
phenomenon of conflict is widely observed and well documented, the
legal literature lacks a comprehensive account of its dimensions. Part II
of this Article seeks to provide such an account. To that end it develops
a unique model of a two-investor-class firm operating in a two-period
world. Consistent with experience, the model predicts that conflict will
increase with a firm's financial distress. It is under conditions of distress
that shareholders and creditors alike will most aggressively agitate for
the firm to use assets in a socially suboptimal manner. Yet the model
also shows that there is nothing magical about insolvency-the point at
which debts exceed asset value. Vertical investor conflict builds
continuously, before and after a firm becomes insolvent, and in this sense
the model suggests that a duty-shifting regime is hard to justify. Part II
then seeks to understand how managers unconstrained by law will
resolve investor conflict. To the extent managers have incentives to
maximize asset value without the threat of judicial intervention, the error
and administrative costs associated with intervention will appear
wasteful. Although under certain conditions managers can be expected
to resolve conflict through a value-maximizing use of assets, Part II
shows that these conditions are difficult to observe. It is not possible to
predict as a general matter whether a manager faced with conflict will
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favor shareholders, favor creditors, or act to maximize the firm's
expected value.
Part III turns to the ideals embodied in our law. In light of the
ambiguous way in which managers can be expected to react to vertical
investor conflict, this Part asks how law would have them behave. It
begins with a survey of existing judicial and scholarly commentary on
the subject, highlighting the doctrinal focus on competing rules of
fiduciary duty. It then develops a theory of fraudulent transfer which,
read in combination with a traditional vision of fiduciary duty, points to
an ideal of asset-value maximization.
Part IV takes up the problem of realizing this ideal through concrete
legal intervention. In particular, it evaluates the means by which law can
encourage self-interested managers to abide to the asset-valuemaximization norm where questions of institutional competence and
collateral costs loom large. This Part argues that legal intervention holds
most promise where markets efficiently price a firm's securities and,
therefore, that judicial deference to management should be at its lowest
in these circumstances. In the case of closely held firms, by contrast, this
Part argues that legal intervention can do little to discipline managers
effectively.
II. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF VERTICAL INVESTOR CONFLICT

It is no secret that shareholders and creditors of a business firm often
disagree about how the firm should use its assets. They may, for
example, disagree about the expected profitability-the relative risks and
rewards-of projects available to the firm. If a widget manufacturing
firm is deciding whether to build a new factory, shareholders and
creditors might differ in their views on the market for widgets. A
shareholder could believe that demand for widgets is very likely to grow
in the next ten years. With additional capacity, she might think, the firm
will be able to take advantage of consumer demand. A creditor could
take the opposite view, that widgets are a fad and that the firm
consequently will not be able to recoup its investment in the new facility.
This is a conflict over predictions about facts and the expected effect of a
firm's activities on its balance sheet, and corporate law furnishes a
straightforward resolution.
It assigns the decision to the firm's
18
management.
Shareholders can remove directors by vote, but in
18.

A small number of extraordinary corporate actions require stockholder consent.

In
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general an investor who is unhappy with management's resolution of this
kind of dispute must find what solace she can in the marketplace, by
selling her interest in the firm.
A balance-sheet dispute can arise between any two investors. There
is nothing special about one's identity as a shareholder or creditor.
Balance-sheet disputes thus are an example of what one can call
horizontal investor conflict: conflict in which the investors' relative
priority in a hierarchical capital structure plays no role. This Article is
concerned with vertical conflict. Vertical investor conflict arises even
where all agree about the expected risks and rewards of a firm's activities
(and potential activities) to its balance sheet. Prediction about the future,
interpretation of facts relevant to the firm's business, is not decisive. In
this sense vertical investor conflict poses questions of corporate lawwho decides how the conflict should be resolved, and according to what
standard?-that may have answers different from horizontal investor
conflict. The key to vertical investor conflict is not "outside" the firm, in
its relations with other persons. It is rather built into the very nature of
hierarchically organized capital structures. Before turning to ways in
which the law responds (or could respond) to vertical investor conflict,
we must first learn to diagnose it and to assess how managers are likely
to respond to it.
A. Diagnosing VerticalInvestor Conflict
To begin, imagine a firm, Acme, with a single class of equity. At
time 0, Acme borrows from its lone creditor and issues a $100 note
payable at time 1. At time 0, Acme's manager is confronted with three
mutually exclusive projects the firm could pursue. One is risky, one
safe, and one entails intermediate risk. Imagine further that everyone
agrees on Acme's payoff possibilities at time 1. Relative to time 0,
Project A has a 50% chance of earning $40, and a 50% chance of losing
$80, for an expected value of $-20. Project B has a 100% chance of
losing $5. This might be a divestment of a division. Project C has a 50%
Delaware, for example, stockholders must approve a decision to merge or dissolve the firm. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 251(c) (merger), 275 (dissolution) (2012). In general, though, the firm's
officers, acting under the supervision of the board of directors, are competent to decide most
questions on which a predictive dispute could arise. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 142(a) (2012). Some
questions are reserved to the board itself. For my purposes in this Article, the assignment of a
question to the board or to officers acting under the board's supervision is irrelevant. Consequently
this Article ignores the identity of the representative and refers generally to the firm's "management"
or, at the risk of too much simplification, its "manager."
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chance of earning $20 and a 50% chance of losing $10, for an expected
value of $5.
Summary of expected effects on Acme's balance sheet

Expected Balance Sheet

Project A

Project B

Project C

-20

-5

5

Which of the projects will the shareholders and the creditor prefer?
If a single investor owned the entire firm (the equity and the debt), it is
easy to see what she would want. She would unambiguously prefer
Project C.19 The answer is more complicated, though, when the equity
and debt are held by different persons.
A financially healthy firm approximates the single-owner result.
Suppose that at time 0 Acme holds assets with a liquidation value of
$2,000. By hypothesis the creditor's principal is assured under any
scenario. At worst, Acme will lose $80 over the period from time 0 to
time 1. The remaining assets, worth $1,920, are more than enough to
satisfy the creditor's claim (i.e., $100). Thus, the creditor is indifferent
between the projects. Shareholders, meanwhile, will unambiguously
prefer Project C. In this healthy state, the shareholders internalize all
expected losses (because the creditor is fully secured), as well as all
expected gains (because the creditor's principal and interest rate are set).
The shareholders prefer the project with an expected $5 gain.
But now suppose another firm, Acme', identical to Acme in every
way except that it is financially distressed. Acme' owns assets worth
$105. Setting aside option value, the equity is worth $5. Which project
do the investors in Acme' want the firm to pursue? Plainly, the
investors' preferences have diverged. Shareholders will agitate for the
firm to pursue Project A. Project A entails a 50% chance that their $5 of
equity will be wiped out and a 50% chance they will earn $40.
Shareholder's expected return from Project A is $17.50. Projects B and

19. This Article assumes throughout that all investors are privately risk-neutral-that is, that
investors' utility of a dollar received from the firm describes a linear function. This is a common
assumption, because although the risk tolerances of real individuals are heterogeneous, investors
may hedge risk they want to avoid (and may take on additional risks they want to incur) through
investments outside the firm. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONoMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 29-30 (1991). Even if investors cannot perfectly
hedge risk through diversification, this Article's claims hold as long as the aggregate risk tolerances
are symmetric across the capital structure. If there is no reason to think that bondholders, say, are
systematically more or less risk-tolerant than shareholders, then one could easily correct this
Article's results from dollars into utils.
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C hold far worse prospects. Project B is certain to wipe out shareholder
equity. If Acme' undertakes Project C, the shareholders face a 50%
chance that their equity will be wiped out and a 50% chance that they
will earn $20. Their expected return, $7.50, is smaller than the $17.50
they expect from Project A.
Arithmetic shows that the creditor's ranked preferences are opposite
to those of the shareholders. If Acme' undertakes Project A, there is a
50% chance that the creditor will recover his entire principal and a 50%
chance that he will lose $75 (expected loss of $37.50). Project B is sure
to leave the creditor unimpaired. And Project C promises a 50% chance
of full recovery and a 50% chance of a $5 loss (expected loss of $2.50).
Summary of Expected Payouts (Acme')

Shareholders
Creditor
Sole Owner

Project A
17.50
-37.50
-20

Project B
-5
0
-5

Project C
7.50
-2.50
5

This simple example illustrates an important dynamic that holds true
Divergence of interest between
in more complicated models.
shareholders and creditors-in fact, between any two classes of investor
with hierarchical rights to a firm's cash flows-depends on the firm's
financial health rather than anything peculiar to the investors themselves.
As a firm approaches insolvency, its shareholders stand to gain from
earnings, but because of their limited liability, suffer only a portion of
losses. Limited liability allows them to externalize risk. Conversely,
losses impair the creditor's interest in a manner that corresponding gains
will not offset (because, at the beginning of any period, the creditor's
maximum return is fixed). The creditor will urge the firm to forego even
expectation-justified risky projects.
Investors and financial economists have long grasped the
fundamental problem of vertical investor conflict and the correlative
question of risk alteration.20 But although the literature on corporate
governance recognizes the issue, scholars in the field have until now
been content to point to it only in a general way. 2 1 My aim in this Article
20. See, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV.
2103, 2105-06 (1994); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309-10 (1976); EUGENE F.
FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 120 (1972).

21.

See supra note 20.
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is to evaluate the law's response to vertical investor conflict. To do so,
we must develop the problem more systematically than legal scholars
have done-to understand where vertical investor conflict is likely to
emerge, and to what degree.
We can continue with the straightforward assumption that both
shareholders and creditors attempt to maximize the expected value of
their respective interests. By comparing the investors' profit identities,
we can learn under what conditions and to what extent the interests will
conflict. Assume a two-period world. At time 0, the firm has assets
worth A0 and an outstanding debt of Po, due at time 1. Putting aside
option value for the moment, the value of equity at time 0 is E0 = Ao Po.22 At time 0 the firm will undertake a portfolio of projects the returns
on which (at time 1) are normally distributed with an identifiable mean
(i') and variance (a). In other words, the investors and manager agree on
the expected value and risk of the firm's projects. Thus, A, is a random
variable and expected AI = A0 + .
Start with the shareholder's profit identity. The crucial fact here is
the doctrine of limited liability, under which a creditor may not hold
shareholders to the fire for defaults on principal due.23 The future value
of asset A is random, because the future is uncertain, but it can be
defined as follows:
E

A1 - P0 if A, > Po
if A, < Po1

1 -10

Equity at time 1 is the difference between time 1 asset value and debt
if that difference is positive, and zero otherwise. Equity El is, like AI, a
random variable, but with a discontinuous distribution. Its expected
value is
(2)

E =
=f f

+

i+)a]

-

Po [prob (A, > Po)],

namely the expected difference between asset value and debt if that
difference is positive, times the probability that the difference will be

22.
time 0.
23.

One can think of Eo as the value shareholders would recover if the firm were liquidated at
See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 331.
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positive. If, as we will assume here along with much of the literature,
asset value A, is normally distributed, E is the expected value of the
truncated portion of the normal distribution above debt Po, assuming Po
has been netted out of every asset realization before it is awarded to the
shareholder.
Equation (2) then just says that shareholders' expected equity value
is the product of that truncated mean and the probability that A1 > Po.
Employing the formula for the mean of the relevant truncated portion
of the normal density function, namely where shareholder return goes to
zero when asset value equals or falls short of debt Po, gives

(3)

=

1+OA((PO-Ao-

where (Po - A) / a
through gives
(4)

=' 1

)(o

=

z is the standard-normal variate.

+

X- +<

0, -

[1-

O
(1

Multiplying

,,A

Po-

The shareholder's expected equity is a function of asset mean and
risk, although weights 1 - (D and p themselves depend on these very
factors as well as on the debt principal. We shall refer to the
corresponding change in shareholder equity as her expected profit Ph
- Eo, that is

This formal statement of shareholder profit suggests a few important
points about how a shareholder is likely to view a firm's potential
projects. Note first that the profit a shareholder associates with any
project portfolio is a weighted sum of the portfolio's expected social
value-namely the overall asset value it is expected to generate-and its
risk. It takes the form psh = Ky + Jo. Unlike the owner of an all-equity
firm, who cares only about expected value, the shareholder in a
hierarchically differentiated capital structure rationally thinks about the
effect risk has on her profit.
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A few more words are in order. First, because tp[(Po - A)/a] is a
probability of a standard normal variate, it is positive. Thus, in the
presence of limited liability, greater portfolio risk always brings the
shareholder greater expected profit. The size of this effect, and thus
risk's potency in generating mean profit, rises as Po - ffalls toward zero
because 9 is a maximum at that point. And because declining Po - 4
equivalently boosts the firm's debt-to-asset ratio Po/I, the shareholder's
incentive to adopt high-risk portfolios approaches its maximum when her
equity Eo = Ao - Po approaches zero and the firm approaches insolvency.
Furthermore, greater portfolio risk a itself boosts risk's positive
influence on expected profit because, provided expected assets exceed
debt, rising a reduces (Po - j)/o and thus lifts q. In sum, a risk-neutral
shareholder will act as a risk-seeker in her common stock investments,
and increasingly so as either the firm approaches insolvency or finds
opportunities to invest in high-risk portfolios.
Not surprisingly, a rising expected value 4 of the firm's projects
itself will boost the shareholder's mean return. That is, coefficient 1 I[(Po - A)/o] of mean return A in equation (4) is the probability that the
firm's assets at time 1 will be greater than Po-and this probability,
although less than one, will always be positive. (Think of it as the
probability that a liquidation at time 1 will generate cash for
shareholders.) All else equal, in other words, shareholders prefer high
over low expected-value portfolios in addition to high-risk ones.
Shareholders will seek to maximize the expected value of the firm's
assets for any fixed amount of risk. They will always prefer that assets
be efficiently used, pushing the firm toward opportunities on its expected
value-variance frontier. In sum, shareholders prefer a high-value project
over a low-value project, and they prefer a risky venture to a safe one, at
a relative rate that depends on the firm's distance from insolvency and on
the portfolio risk itself.
Until now we have been discussing shareholders' wishes. We need
also to consider the firm's opportunities, that is, the way A and a trade
off in the marketplace. Economic theory tells us that on the firm's
market frontier, the expected value of available projects is related to their
risk. A risk-neutral investor seeks opportunities which maximize
expected value, whatever their variance. By definition, a risk-seeking
(risk-averse) investor is one who is willing to accept lower expected
value in order to increase (decrease) variance.
The tradeoff between expected value and risk that shareholders
prefer is the tradeoff that maximizes their expected profit.
Mathematically inclined readers will see immediately that the
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mechanism by which shareholders best exploit the risk-expected value
tradeoff available to them in the market lies in the coefficients in
equation (4). The coefficients indicate that a shareholder will become
increasingly insensitive to risk-will increasingly seek expected value
relative to risk-as expected assets increase relative to debt owed. To
see this, hold everything in equation (4) constant except assets. Imagine
assets growing large relative to principal owed. As assets relative to
principal increases, Po - AI takes on a large negative value. This value
lies in the left tail, so to speak, of the probability distribution. The
cumulative probability of such an outlier goes to zero as assets go to
infinity, and consequently the coefficient of the expected-value term goes
to one. At the same time, the coefficient of the risk term goes to zero. In
other words, the social expected-value term increasingly dominates the
shareholders' profit equation as the firm's debt-to-assets ratio falls. The
intuition is straightforward. A firm with a small debt-to-assets ratio
approaches the all-equity or single-owner firm described above. And
recall that shareholders in an all-equity firm care only about the expected
value of the firm's projects. As the debt-to-assets ratio increases, on the
other hand, the coefficient of the expected-value term diminishes and the
coefficient of the risk term increases. In descriptive terms, the impact of
risk on the shareholders' profit equation increases as the firm's expected
debt-to-assets ratio increases. The greater the firm's debt-to-assets ratio,
the more a shareholder will be expected to agitate for risk at the expense
of expected value.
We can derive the expected value of a creditor's interest (PI) and
expected profit (gcr) in a similar fashion. Here the starting point is
twofold: (1) the creditor's maximum recovery is Po, which he receives
whenever A1 Po, and (2) the creditor receives AI whenever AI < Po.
(6) P =Po
(
A

A 12 Po
A, < Po.

if
if

If at time 0 the firm is solvent, then it is helpful to think of the
interval between time 0 and time 1 as exposing the creditor to losses
only. Creditor's "profit" equation takes on a strictly negative (or zero)
value. In the interest of conserving paper and time, I give the creditor's
profit equation as follows:
(7) p~c

i)

((P
q(Po

a+[

p(PO-Ali)p-

0
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Like shareholders, a creditor will always prefer high expected-value
projects over low-value projects, all else equal. To understand the
intuition at play, think of a high expected-value project as shifting the
distribution of possible assets at time 1 to the right. Holding risk
constant, boosting a project's expected value will reduce the cumulative
probability that assets at time 1 will be less than P0 . That is, the higher
the project's mean return, the greater is the likelihood that the firm will
have assets sufficient to pay off the creditor in full.
Unlike shareholders, though, a creditor dislikes risk. In fact, a
positive change in risk decreases a creditor's expected recovery by
precisely the amount it increases shareholders' expected profit. Risk
alteration has zero-sum consequences. 24 Holding all else constant,
increasing the variance of a firm's performance decreases the creditor's
expected recovery. Creditors prefer high-value, low-risk projects. But
as in the case of the shareholder, the creditor seeking to maximize his
expected profit must trade off between expected value and risk among
projects available in the market. When the firm is highly solvent, the
expected-value term dominates the creditor's profit equation-just as it
does for, and for the same reasons as in, the shareholder's profit
equation. But as the firm's expected debt-to-assets ratio increases, so
does the relative importance of risk in the creditor's profit. As the firm
approaches insolvency, a creditor is increasingly willing to trade highvalue for low-risk projects.
Modeling shareholder and creditor payouts as we have reveals some
important points about vertical investor conflict. First, the presence of
conflict between vertically differentiated investors does not depend on
differences in their risk tolerances. The model above assumes that each
investor is risk neutral. It shows that a risk-neutral shareholder will
appearrisk-seeking in the context of her investment in a limited-liability
firm, and that a risk-neutral creditor will appear risk-averse in the
context of his investment in the same firm. Nor does a conflict
necessarily turn on differing estimates of projects' expected balance24. This is not strictly true if only the firm's creditors at time 0 are taken into account. Because
limited liability protects existing creditors from reprisal by future creditors in the same way it
protects shareholders, increasing risk can in extreme cases generate a positive sum for investors at
time 0. Think, for example, of a firm that at time 0 considers moving into the chemicals industry,
taking on potentially massive environmental liability. I set aside this possibility here in order to
focus on the typical case. For an argument that the problem is smaller than scholars have suggested
(and for a thoughtful discussion of the related literature), see Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to
Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An EmpiricalAnalysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037,
1038-46 (2008).
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sheet effect or risk. Our model has assumed that each investor knows (or
at least agrees on) the firm's debt-to-assets ratio at time 0, as well as the
expected value of and risk associated with the firm's possible projects.
The investors' differing rights in the firm, apart from their private
characteristics, causes vertical investor conflict.
Second, the magnitude of vertical investor conflict depends on the
firm's debt-to-assets ratio. Shareholder and creditor interests are never
perfectly aligned.
Shareholders always display some risk-seeking
tendency and creditors always appear risk-averse. But when the firm is
highly solvent-when, that is, assets are large relative to debt-the
conflict practically disappears. When the firm is highly solvent, the
expected value of the firm's projects dominate the profit equations of
shareholder and creditor alike. As the debt-to-assets ratio goes to zero,
the vertically differentiated investors' unity becomes perfect and seeks
asset-value-maximizing projects. Investors in such a firm will agree on
how the firm should operate, subject only to the caveat that a creditor and
shareholder, like any two shareholders or any two creditors, might
disagree about which ventures in particular are likely to maximize
expected asset value. As the firm approaches insolvency, on the other
hand, shareholders and creditors become increasingly risk-sensitive.
Both classes of investor increasingly care about the risk rather than the
expected balance-sheet effect of the firm's projects.25
Another way to think of the dynamic is to start by considering the
expected (social) value of a firm's potential projects. When a firm is
highly solvent-or, to take the extreme case, when all of the claims
against a firm's assets are in the hands of a single investor-the expected
social value of the firm's available projects dominates the investors'
private profit identities. What is best in expectation for the firm's
balance sheet is also best for the investors' pocketbooks. But as the
firm's debt-to-assets ratio increases, the risk associated with available
projects takes on increasing importance to the investors. As we saw in
the hypothetical above, both shareholder and creditor will wish the firm
to forego the projects with the greatest social value-although their
reasons for doing so and the direction in which they push the firm will be
strictly opposed. Neither shareholder nor creditor will seek the social
25. This analysis of course assumes that the firm's capital structure is fixed. As we shall see,
the prospect of restructuring, including the outright unification of the capital structure through
buyout, may temper investors' apparent deviation from risk neutrality. Indeed, in a world without
transaction costs the existence of possible restructuring would eliminate vertical investor conflict
entirely.
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optimum.
B. ManagerialIncentives under Conditions of Conflict
At first blush, managers rather than shareholders or creditors decide
how to deploy a firm's assets. Understanding how managers are likely to
react to vertical investor conflict absent legal intervention is thus crucial
to an evaluation of law's domain. How do managers act in the face of
vertical investor conflict? Whom do they favor, if anyone? At first
approximation, it is fair to say that a person works for those who can fire
her. In a healthy firm, shareholders ultimately hold the right to fire, and
one can conveniently think of management as their (imperfect) agents.
But there is a competing and equally apt maxim: one's boss tomorrow is
one's boss today. Lame ducks command little allegiance. A manager
who believes that someone other than today's shareholders will hold the
whip hand tomorrow tries to satisfy the heir apparent. This section
explores the manager-investor dynamic in financially distressed firms. It
aims to show that managerial reaction to vertical investor conflict is
ambiguous. Theory cannot tell us much about the risk tolerance
managers will exhibit-whether, in other words, they will tend to favor
shareholders or creditors. Managers are likely to seek projects entailing
more risk than creditors want but less than shareholders do. This
ambiguity has important consequences. Among other things, it means
that third-party observers, courts among them, lack a stable presumption
about the kind of projects the manager of a distressed firm is likely to
choose. Investor dissatisfaction can serve at best as a weak signal of
deviation from a legal norm (unless the legal rule is that managers should
always act in the interest of one or another constituency).
On the traditional view of corporate governance, managers are
thought to be aligned principally with a firm's shareholders. Directors
serve at the mercy of the shareholders' vote; officers serve at the board's.
Although ousters are rare in public companies, the mere threat of a proxy
fight or takeover attempt disciplines managers who might otherwise
ignore dispersed shareholders. Similarly, managers often hold, and are
expected to hold, a significant equity stake in the firms they manage,
aligning incentives. This is not to say that theorists of the firm have
understood managers as faithful agents. That idea was long ago
discredited, and an extensive agency-cost literature describes the
tendency of a firm's managers to shirk responsibilities, consume
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excessive perquisites, or otherwise self-deal.2 6 But the accepted view has
been that, in a choice between shareholders and creditors, the manager
would, and perhaps should, naturally support the shareholders.27
Recent scholarship has questioned the conventional wisdom,
focusing on the power of creditors, especially senior bank lenders, to
influence management's investment decisions.28 Most directly, a lender
might control the firm's risk profile through covenants restricting capital
expenditures or fundamental changes to the firm's business model.29
Because risk alteration often depends on significant outlays, as for
example when a firm wishes to enter a new line of business, the veto
associated with these covenants is for better or worse a powerful check
on shareholder preferences.
Covenants facially having nothing to do with investment policy offer
creditors a subtler, yet equally important lever to influence manager
behavior.3 0 A typical bank loan includes manifold covenants.
Some
relate to the firm's financial condition. For example, the debtor may
covenant that the ratio of its earnings to outstanding debt will remain
above an agreed threshold.32 Other ubiquitous covenants relate only

26.

See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION

AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 220-32 (1932) (discussing the social expectations and legal rules
impacting managerial behavior); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 312-13 (comparing
the incentives and behavior of an owner-manager to that of a manager of a firm owned by outside
investors).
27. See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 123-25 (2009) (describing the
conventional wisdom); see also George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in
Interactive CorporateGovernance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1076-77 (1995).
28. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1
J. LEG. ANALYSIS 511, 538-39 (2009); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, PrivateDebt and
the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1251 (2006); Triantis &
Daniels, supra note 27, at 1082-91; Tung, supra note 27, at 125-35. Financial economists began
considering creditor influence somewhat earlier. See, e.g., Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi,
Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 400 (2009); Clifford W.
Smith Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On FinancialContracting:An Analysis ofBond Covenants, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 117 (1979).
29. A recent study finds that roughly 25 percent of public corporations have a bank loan
agreement with a capital expenditure restriction. Nini et al., supra note 28, at 405.
30. Frederick Tung offers a thoughtful account of this form of creditor influence. See Tung,
supra note 27, at 140-59. He finds that "covenant violations are common, even among well-run
companies." Id. at 134. See also Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 28, at 1227-36 (discussing the
evolving law permitting lenders to have increasing control over major corporations through strict
covenants).
31. For a sampling of the kinds of covenants often accompanying bank debt, see THE LSTA's
COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE (Richard Wright, et al., eds.) 281-389 (2009).
32. For examples of common financial covenants, see id. at 293-3 10.
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indirectly to the firm's financial health: the promise to maintain
appropriate insurance, for example, or to furnish data concerning the
firm's business. 3 3 The violation of any covenant typically empowers the
lender to call its loan due immediately. This right provides considerable
leverage. If the debt owed to creditor C is large relative to the firm's
liquid asset base, a decision by C to accelerate his loan's maturity can
effectively force the firm into Chapter 11. Formal reorganization is
costly, and especially so for the officers of a corporate debtor, most of
whom can expect to be shown the door.34 A CEO who values her job, or
who values a soft landing after dismissal, is therefore inclined to listen
carefully to a creditor's advice after a covenant violation. And the same
is true even before a firm trips the control wire by violating a covenant.
The manager of a distressed firm knows only too well that a technical
default lurks around the corner; that the firm's ability to satisfy its
covenants will turn to some degree on fortune. The manager thus weighs
her options with bankruptcy looming in the shadow.
It is not just that creditors, as a class, have leverage comparable to
that of shareholders, as a class. Creditors may also be more adept at
using it. The power to enforce loan covenants typically rests with a
single bank or a small syndicate of lenders. According to one theory of
capital structure, this concentrated interest among the senior creditors is
vital to efficient monitoring of management slack.
The power to fire
directors and, indirectly, senior executives, on the other hand, is widely
dispersed among shareholders. Thus, the concentration of interest that
makes a good monitor also makes a good user of leverage.
A manager set on keeping her job faces an ambiguous landscape.
We have seen that as a firm moves toward insolvency, its shareholders
and creditors alike will agitate for risk alteration. Shareholders might
fire the manager if, from their perspective, her investment decisions are
too risk-averse. Yet by pursuing a relatively risk-seeking strategy (to
pacify shareholders), the manager exposes herself to the possibility that a
vigilant creditor will invoke a covenant default to oust her; and, of

33. Id
34. See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 28, at 512-20 (finding that 70 percent of CEOs are
replaced within the two years following the bankruptcy filing).
35. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 28, at 1209-11 (connecting the firing of Krispy
Kreme's CEO, outside formal bankruptcy proceedings, to the implied threat of creditor action).
36. Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92 YALE
L.J. 49, 57-59 (1982) (explaining that for a lender to have the proper incentives to monitor, it has to
enjoy the benefits of monitoring).
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course, it is precisely when the firm is financially distressed that
covenant default is most likely. How the manager gauges the investors'
relative power will turn on particulars: the relative concentration of
interest in the investor classes, the nature of the covenants in place
(especially the perceived likelihood of a default), and even the
personalities of key investors.
The manager faces a dilemma whatever her assessment of these
factors. Multiple strategies are plausible. Suppose, for example, the
manager thinks shareholder and bank power is in equipoise. She thinks
that at future time t there is a fifty percent chance that the bank will
effectively have the firing power. One strategy would be to pursue a
middle path, a risk-neutral investment strategy. The manager pursuing
this strategy hopes that her decision will not anger either constituency
too much. She may be disappointed to learn, however, that she angered
both. Each constituency has another manager in mind. Depending on
the situation, then, the manager might decide to cast her lots with one or
another constituency.
A self-interested manager's regard for her job is of course only one
factor determining her optimal strategy. It is hard to imagine an
executive who is not also a passive investor in the firm she manages.
The firm's operations are bound to have wealth effects on these
investments. Here again, though, the net effect on the manager's
apparent risk tolerance is a question about which little in the abstract can
be said. Most managers-most officers, anyway-hold common stock.
Employment agreements often mandate it. As a stockholder, the
manager will tend to favor a risk-seeking investment strategy. But
managers often hold debt or claims against the firm with debt-like
characteristics. 3 7 As a creditor (or quasi-creditor), the manager will tend
to favor a risk-averse investment strategy.
One can think of a self-interested manager as choosing investment
strategies that promise to maximize the expected value of her own,
private wealth identity. The manager derives wealth from passive
shareholding, passive debt holding, and from employment (in the form of
salary and perquisites), the last of which itself depends on satisfying both
shareholders and creditors. Thus, the manager's profit equation is a

37. Defined-benefit pension interests are effectively debt. A deferred compensation plan is
another example. Deferred compensation promises the manager a fixed payment (similar to the face
value of a bond) at a future, specified date (similar to a maturity date). The manager faces downside
risk but has no upside.
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weighted average of the shareholder and creditor profit equations. In the
language of the model above, the self-interested manager seeks to
maximize the following equation:
(8) Mma

= OCPsh +

(1-oc)

rc-38

where the coefficient oc is the weight accorded to shareholder interests.
The manager's apparent risk tolerance turns on the relative weight
she is likely to give to the interests of each investor class. In the extreme
case it will be relatively easy to figure out. Imagine a self-interested
manager who works for a salary of $1 per year and values the perquisites
of office at $0. If she owns $1 million of stock and holds no debt-like
interests, then she will exhibit the risk-seeking tendency associated with
the shareholders. And likewise she will pursue a risk-averse strategy if
the $1 million is tied up in a deferred compensation plan. 39 In the run-ofthe-mill case, though, the puzzle is intractable. The typical manager
holds a combination of equity and debt-like interests, perhaps weighted
toward equity. 40 But she also enjoys the financial and other privileges of
tenure. It might be possible to determine a manager's optimal strategy if
one had complete information, including knowledge of the manager's
subjective assessment of the firm's prospects and its investors'
idiosyncratic characteristics. On that I am agnostic. The thesis here is
less ambitious. It is that in most cases where a firm faces financial
distress, theory furnishes little predictive power about the kind of
investment strategies the firm's management will be inclined to pursue
absent the threat of legal intervention.
This ambiguity is of central concern when thinking about how legal
38. I have assumed throughout that the firm's investors are privately risk-neutral. There may
be reason to doubt whether the assumption is a plausible one for executive officers. A rich literature
of executive compensation assumes that executives, unable fully to diversify their investment in the
firm, will exhibit risk-averse tendencies. See Joseph G. Haubrich, Risk Aversion, PerformancePay,
and the Principal-AgentProblem, 102 J. POL. ECON. 258, 267 (1994). On the other hand, some
studies suggest that corporate executives, like politicians, are risk seekers across a number of
domains. See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts:A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 18 (1993) ("[S]tudies of individual choice have
shown that managers, like other people, are risk-seeking in the domain of losses.").
39. Even in this unlikely hypothetical, the manager's strategy is perhaps uncertain. To the
extent manager A's decisions can be reversed by a subsequent manager B-after A has been fired-a
strategy of partial appeasement could be optimal.
40. See M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1548-57 (2007) (reporting that in public
companies, up to half of CEO compensation is in the form of equity).
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rules might encourage managers to seek the social good, a question to
which Part IV is addressed. It is worth pausing here, however, to note
that the manager most likely to maximize a firm's value is the manager
who weighs the interests of investor classes equally. This manager has
the following profit identity:
(9) Pma = .51tsi +.5Icr-

Substituting equations (5) and (6) for the shareholder and creditor
profit identities, respectively, yields the following equation after cross
multiplying and modestly simplifying:
(10) /ma = .5 1 -

P

A

A- -. 5(Eo - Po)

+ .5 [

= .5 A 1 - .5(E 0 - Po)
= .5[(Ao+p) -. 5[(Ao -Po)

-

Po]

because A1 = A0 + It and E0 = Ao - Po. Simplifying reveals a profit

equation in which risk plays no part:
(11)

Yma =

-1

A manager who weighs shareholder and creditor interests equally
acts risk neutrally. She maximizes her expected profit by maximizing
the social value of the firm's projects.
III. VALUE MAXIMIZATION AS A LEGAL IDEAL

In a laissez faire world, management resolution of vertical investor
conflict is ambiguous. The value of legal intervention, then, depends in
the first instance on the ideal the law seeks. This is clear enough. Every
legal intervention generates costs, and its utility therefore turns on the
degree to which it encourages social behavior. Suppose, for example,
that in the face of vertical investor conflict the law wants managers to
use corporate assets for their own interests first and foremost, subject to
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explicit limitations imposed by statute or contract.41 It is hard to imagine
a doctrine of intervention serving any purpose. Yet another rule may
better achieve different resolution. The question in this Part is what
norm, what ideal, of managerial behavior the law seeks when the
interests of a firm's investors conflict. It argues that our law asks
managers to maximize the value of firm assets to investors as a group,
and that the law does so through the synthesis of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty (owed to shareholders) and fraudulent transfer principles (owed
to creditors).
It will be helpful to note at the outset that the managerial problem
arises only because of incomplete contracting.4 2 To the extent explicit
investment contracts direct the manager to do one thing or another,
ordinary contract principles furnish easy answers. And as we have seen,
a variety of explicit promises typically restrict managerial freedom in the
modern business organization.43 Yet inevitably managers enjoy a residue
of discretion, sometimes more and sometimes less. Expert judgment in
the use of this residual authority justifies managerial salaries, and
without residual authority there would be no need for incentive-based
payments. Managers could be paid like administrators. That, of course,
is not our world. Managers in fact enjoy wide latitude in their
deployment of firm assets. The concern here is the standard of judgment
by which managers should exercise whatever residual discretion they
hold.
There is a large body of literature-statutory, judicial, and
scholarly-on this most important question of corporate governance.
Courts and scholars have generally assumed that the answer lies in the
definition of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and this Part begins with a
brief survey and evaluation of the conclusions they have reached.
Traditionally, fiduciary duties have been understood to run in favor of
shareholders and shareholders only, suggesting that a manager is
permitted, even obliged, to ignore creditor interests (including suppliers,
employees, and other creditor-like constituencies). This Part then argues
that singular focus on fiduciary duty is misguided. Debtor-creditor law
has much to say about managerial norms. In particular, this Part argues,
41. Cf Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1315-16 (arguing that no residual legal duty ought
to run from managers to their firms or investors, but rather that they "should merely be obliged to
honor the terms of the firm's investment contracts, even when they lead to decisions that are not
value-maximizing ex post for the investors as a group").
42. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 19, at 90-108.
43. See supra Part ILB.
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fraudulent transfer principles suggest that a value-maximization norm
underlies existing law.
A. Competing Visions of the Duty of Loyalty
The traditional understanding of fiduciary duty is well illustrated by
the canonical case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co." The case turned on
Henry Ford's plan to reinvest Ford Motor Company's profits in
additional factories rather than pay a special dividend to the firm's
shareholders.
Whether expansion would ultimately benefit the
shareholders was not Ford's main concern. He explained that under his
direction Ford's mission would be to provide work and inexpensive cars
to an undifferentiated labor class that had no legal claim on the
company's assets. In the suit brought by objecting shareholders, the
court held that Ford's plan was inconsistent with his fiduciary obligation.
The manager could not seek to enrich outsiders at the expense of
shareholders.4 5
The managerial ideal described in Dodge and similar cases is that of
shareholder-wealth maximization.46 Not every decided case is consistent
with the rule, of course, 47 but it is a fair approximation to say that
shareholder-wealth maximization has been the traditional, direct aim of
the duty of loyalty.48 Dodge pitted the interests of shareholders against
the interests of a generalized labor force or class of society; it did not
specifically address the conflict between vertically differentiated
investors. 49 But a number of cases out of Delaware and other important
44. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
45. For a detailed account and competing interpretation of Dodge, see M. Todd Henderson,
Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., University of Chicago Law
&
Economics,
Olin
Working
Paper
No.
373
(2007),
available
at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/373.pdf.
46. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 681-82.
47. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (dismissing derivative suit in
which shareholders claimed directors acted negligently by failing to install lights at Wrigley Field in
order to hold profitable weekday night games). Shlensky undoubtedly represents a minority view. It
may be best understood as a decision anticipating nuisance liability or proto-liability.
48. See Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone ofInsolvency, I J. Bus. & TECH. L. 607, 609
(2007) [hereinafter Tung, Insolvency] ("Under the well-known shareholder primacy rubric-long
dominant among courts and commentators-directors' fiduciary duties run exclusively in favor of
the corporation's common shareholders, and duty requires the board to maximize shareholder
returns."); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director
Serve? A Look at the Tensions FacingConstituency Directors,63 BUS. LAw. 761, 766 (2008) ("[l]n
Delaware, the directors' duties to stockholders must trump their concerns for other constituencies.").
49. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670-71.
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States have subsequently made the connection explicit.o On the
traditional view, managers deciding how to employ firm assets ought to
privilege the common shareholders over competing constituencies.
In 1991, Delaware's Court of Chancery took up the question of
vertical investor conflict explicitly in Credit Lyonnais.51 As in Dodge,
the plaintiffs in CreditLyonnais alleged that management had violated its
duty of loyalty by choosing a course of action that preferred a
constituency (creditors, in this case) over shareholders.52 Chancellor
Allen refused to intervene, holding that when a firm is in the vicinity of
insolvency, creditors are a part of the "community of interests" that
managers can and should consider.53 The decision appeared to create a
regime in which the direction of fiduciary duties shifts with the degree of
a firm's solvency.
Even before, but especially in the years following Credit Lyonnais,
scholars have posed a variety of normative criticisms of Delaware
fiduciary duty doctrine. One branch of criticism has defended a
shareholder-wealth maximization principle on normative grounds.54
Reasons have varied. Some commentators have advanced a quasimetaphysical argument that equity holders, unlike other investors, "own"
the firm in some intangible sense.
Others have argued that the

50. E.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988) ("[A] convertible debenture
represents a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a debt and does not represent an equitable
interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with
concomitant fiduciary duties."); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 1108.10 (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) ("Outside of bankruptcy, the traditional rule is that so long as
a corporation is solvent, the obligations of its officers and directors, including the duties of care and
loyalty, run to stockholders, not creditors.").
51. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ.A.12150, 1991
WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
52. Id.at*1154.
53. Idat*1155-57.
54. See Bainbridge, Defense, supra note 6, at 1446-47 (asserting that a rule favoring
shareholder interests "has helped produce an economy that is dominated by public corporations,
which in tum has produced the highest standard of living of any society in the history of the world");
Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and Ends of CorporateGovernance, 97 Nw.
U. L. REV. 547, 605-06 (2003) (arguing that director primacy in decision-making can be reconciled
with shareholder wealth-maximization); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado about Little? Directors'
FiduciaryDuties in the Vicinity ofInsolvency, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 335, 355 (2007) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Much Ado] (arguing that traditional allegiance to shareholders is preferred because
responsibility to a larger constituency leads directors to primarily pursue self-interest); Hu &
Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1402-03 (calling for abolition of duty-shifting doctrine); Tung,
Insolvency, supra note 48, at 625-26 (arguing that extending fiduciary duties to creditors, at least to
sophisticated bank lenders, would be counterproductive).
55. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1323.

26

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

shareholder-wealth maximization is a contractual term that should be
honored like any other.56 Still others have argued on efficiency grounds
or for psychological reasons that managers should exercise their
discretion exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.
Another branch of criticism has sought a norm antithetical to the
traditional, shareholder-centered norm. Recognizing that risk-shifting
threatens appropriation by shareholders of creditor wealth, and that the
risk of appropriation increases the cost of raising capital through debt,
commentators in this vein have argued for a strong rule of creditor
protection. In short, they argue that managers should pursue shareholder
welfare through increasing the risk of corporate projects only when doing
so would not diminish expected creditor recoveries-only when, in other
words, increasing risk is Pareto optimal among the firm's investors.
Yet, another school favors managers over either shareholder or
creditor constituencies. In a recent article, Douglas Baird and Todd
Henderson argued that courts should forget about fiduciary duty
altogether.59 Managers must honor explicit contracts, they argue, but
courts should be out of the business of second-guessing decisions by
reference to the implicit contract known as fiduciary duty.60 In practical
terms, this argument amounts to a rule that managers should do what
benefits them within the limits of explicit contracts. 6' In the language of
Part II, the manager is justified in maximizing her own profit equation
rather than the expected profits of any other constituency or
62
constituencies.
In another light, this pro-management approach can be understood as
56. Bainbridge, Much Ado, supra note 54, at 337.
57. Viral V. Acharya, Yakov Amihud & Lubomir Litov, Creditor Rights and Corporate RiskTaking, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 150, 152 (2011) (proposing that strong creditors' rights in default may
lead to inefficient liquidation and hurt shareholder value); Bainbridge, Defense, supra note 6, at
1427 (discussing Milton Friedman's assertion that managers steal from shareholders when placing
non-shareholder interests above equity interests); Tung, Insolvency, supra note 48, at 609 (claiming
that sophisticated creditors can more efficiently control manager behavior by contract, rather than
through the judicial system).
58. E.g., McDaniel, Corporate Governance, supra note 7, at 449-50 (1986); McDaniel,

Stockholders, supra note 7, at 222 (1988). McDaniel argues on behalf of bondholders in particular,
but his argument seems to apply with equal force to creditors in general. See also David Millon,
Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223, 226 (1991) (exploring the implications of director-

duty statutes that expand directors' obligations to non-shareholders).
59.

Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1315-16.

60. Id. at 1327-28.
61.

See id (arguing for a rule that imposes on managers a fiduciary duty to the corporation as a

whole through a "contractarian" approach).
62.

See id.
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stating an argument about the deficits of judicial intervention rather than
about the ideal toward which law would have managers strive.6 ' And in
this sense Baird and Henderson are probably nearest the attitude of
Delaware's courts. In decisions since Credit Lyonnais, its chancery and
supreme courts have explained that the "shifting" managerial duties
Chancellor Allen described are not meant to give creditors standing to
challenge corporate decisions; they are rather a justification on which
management can rely in defense to shareholder suit. Managers can
invoke their fiduciary obligation to creditors as a shield against
shareholder challenges; but creditors, lacking any definite weight of
consideration, cannot use the obligation as a sword.6 The Credit
Lyonnais doctrine represents skepticism about judges' ability to diagnose
socially inefficient management.
In any event, it should be clear that every conceivable constituency
has at least an advocate or two among the academy. There are
commentators who in turn would privilege shareholders, creditors, and
managers. Yet the functional importance of the fiduciary rule is not
immediately obvious. One can think of each competing rule as
bestowing a property right on its favored constituency, namely the right
to choose (or veto) corporate projects. The Coasean insight is clear:
absent transaction costs, the choice of rule will not influence the ventures
a hypothetical firm pursues.
Imagine a firm presented with a possible new project. The project
entails high risk and has negative expected social value. In expectation
and relative to the status quo, it is worth $5 to shareholders, $1 to the
manager, and will cause creditors to lose $10. Irrespective of the
constituency holding the property right, the firm operating in a
frictionless world will not pursue the new project. If shareholders hold
the right, creditors will pay between $6 and $10 to persuade the
shareholders to forego it; likewise if the manager has the prerogative.
63. See id at 1323 (stating that the business judgment rule is an "awkward tool for giving
directors the legal guidance they need to make good decisions").
64. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that
the Court would be loath to choose between plausibly risky (pro-shareholder) and safe (pro-creditor)
strategies); see also N. Am. Catholic Edu. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
99-101 (Del. 2007) (ratifying Prod Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004));
Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1310-15.
65. See Prod Res. Grp., L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 789-90.
66. The Coase Theorem can be stated as follows: if both parties know the rule of law when
they act, the economic result is the same regardless of the legal outcome. Coltman v. Commissioner,
980 F.2d 1134, 1137 (7th Cir. 1992).
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And if creditors hold the right, then-unsurprisingly-they will decline
the project because the $6 that the shareholders and managers jointly
would pay to pursue the project is less than the loss the creditors would
expect to suffer. In any case, the firm will pursue the strategy that is
socially optimal and that maximizes the expected returns of the investors
as a whole.
There is no frictionless world, of course. Transaction costs are likely
to be relatively small in the context of a close firm, a point to which Part
IV will return, but informational asymmetries between management and
investors are chronic even where bargaining costs are low. Still, the
thought experiment suggests another possible norm of management
behavior in the face of vertical investor conflict-that the manager
should pursue that course which maximizes the value of the firm's assets
to the investors as a whole. One can think of the asset-valuemaximization norm as casting a veil of ignorance over corporate law.
This is by no means a novel suggestion. Economists and legal scholars
influenced by a contractarian approach to corporate law have lobbied in
its favor for some time.
An asset-value-maximization norm has much to commend it on
normative grounds. Fundamentally, it directs assets to their socially
optimal use. In contrast to proposals for a "shifting" norm, asset-value
maximization also eliminates discontinuity in managerial responsibility.
Vertical investor conflict is described by a continuous function. Discord
increases continuously as a firm's debt-to-assets ratio grows. There is
little reason to create a discontinuity and the attendant risk of strategic
game-playing. To be sure, firms and their investors regularly agree to
create discontinuities by contract, and some discontinuities turn on the
firm's financial condition. Yet it is hard to fathom an argument for such
contractual discontinuity if managers' good-faith application of an assetCovenants creating
value-maximization norm can be assumed.
discontinuity are, in other words, responses to perhaps rational fears that
creditors will not have practical recourse against managerial infidelity.
A full-throated normative defense of asset-value maximization is
67. Because investment is contractual, the rule would not even have distributional
consequences.
68. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 217-18 (arguing that rational investors engaged in a
hypothetical bargain "would agree to a norm that told managers to maximize the value of the
diversified portfolios that CAPM says rational investors would hold"). Baird and Henderson in fact
describe this view as dominant among law-and-economics scholars. See Baird & Henderson, supra
note 9, at 1313-14.
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beyond this Article's scope. 6 9 The purpose here is descriptive. Those
who have championed an asset-value maximization norm have done so
aspirationally, assuming uncritically that a change in state fiduciary law
would need to instantiate the norm. The discussion below aims to show
that myopic focus on fiduciary duty doctrine has clouded the debate over
a more general managerial obligation and that, to put the point clearly,
asset-value maximization is already the principle toward which our law
seeks to direct managers.
B. A Theory ofFraudulentTransfer
This Part's central contention is that the principles of fraudulent
transfer point in the direction of an existing asset-value maximization
norm. The role of fraudulent transfer in corporate governance has been
almost entirely neglected. Why this is so is something of a mystery. In
part, it may be a result of historical classifications. The law of fiduciary
obligation has always fallen under the rubric of a firm's "internal
affairs"o70 For corporations, the law of the firm's state of incorporation
governs the scope and application of fiduciary duty;" for partnerships,
the law of the state in which the partnership is made.72 In particular, the
courts of equity traditionally policed the boundaries of fiduciary
obligation in the corporate context. Thus scholars and other thoughtful
lawyers have overwhelmingly focused on the jurisprudence of the
Delaware courts of chancery.7 3 Fraudulent transfer, on the other hand,
developed first as part of the criminal law and, later, as an exception to
general rules of property transfer and ownership.7 4 Courts have never
understood fraudulent transfer claims as falling within the internal affairs

69. For a thorough defense, see Smith, supra note 8.
70. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 72 (2013) ("The internal affairs doctrine
applies to such matters as ... fiduciary obligations to the corporation . . . .").
71. Total Holdings USA, Inc. v. Curran Composites, Inc., 999 A.2d 873, 884 (Del. Ch. 2009)
("The internal affairs rule requires that the internal affairs of a corporation . . . are governed by the
law of the corporation's domicile.") (internal citation omitted).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Byron F. Egan, FiduciaryDuties of Corporate Directorsand Officers in Texas,
43-SPG TEx. J. Bus. L. 45, 179 (2009) ("Given the extent of Delaware case law dealing with
director fiduciary duties, it is certain, however, that Delaware cases will be cited and argued by
corporate lawyers negotiating transactions and handling any subsequent litigation.").
74. See Jon Travis Powers, Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Uniform Fraudulent
TransferAct: ForStatute of Limitations Purposes, Is Such Liability Grounded in Fraudor Created
by Statute?, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4 Art. 5 (2011) (explaining the origins of fraudulent transfer
law in The Statute of Elizabeth, a penal statute).
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doctrine; the state in which the contested property is held has determined
fraudulent transfer's domain.
Perhaps more importantly, fraudulent transfer has never received the
theoretical attention that lawyers and scholars have lavished on the law
of fiduciary duty.75 Since 1570, every Anglo-American jurisdiction has
prohibited debtors from transferring assets with the intent to "hinder,
delay or defraud" creditors.76 Following the courts' lead, scholars have
focused on describing and identifying "badges of fraud," evidentiary
markers that a fraudulent transfer has occurred.n Few have asked the
fundamental question-what about a transfer makes it likely to "hinder,
delay or defraud."78 What is it, in other words, that the badges of fraud
are thought to signal? Without a theory of fraudulent transfer, it should
be no surprise that scholars and lawyers have generally ignored the
doctrine's implications for the norms of corporate governance.7 9 I
suggest that attending to fraudulent transfer's meaning will, in particular,
yield valuable information about the way in which managers are meant
to resolve vertical investor conflict.
A theory of fraudulent transfer must start with Robert Clark, one of
the few scholars who has sought to understand the theoretical principles
75.

Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L.

REV. 505, 506 (1977) (asserting that identifying the purposes of fraudulent conveyance law is "a task
sorely neglected in literally hundreds of cases applying that body of law").
76. The formulation dates to Parliament's enactment of a criminal sanction. 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 5
(Eng.). Every State in the United States has codified the prohibition through adoption either of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7 or its successor model statute, the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act §4(a). John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers: When a
Claimant Doesn't Have a Claim, When a Transfer Isn't a Transfer, When Fraud Doesn't Stay
Fraudulent, and Other Important Limits to Fraudulent Transfers Law for the Asset Protection

Planner, 22 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 955, 1049 (1997). The Bankruptcy Code makes it federal law. 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012)..
77.

See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

§

4(b), 7A U.L.A. 58, 59 (2006) (enumerating

traditional badges of fraud). Responding to suits accompanying the rise of leveraged buyouts in the
1980s, a handful of scholars also began to consider the application of a relatively recent doctrinal
development, the "constructive" fraudulent transfer. E.g., Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and
Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781, 792

(1988) ("[T]he constructive fraud provisions of the UFCA only apply to a limited category of debtor
transactions which adversely affect creditors under certain circumstances of financial exigency.");
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38

VAND. L. REv. 829, 830 (1985) (describing an approach that "presumes mischief when an insolvent
debtor voluntarily transferred property and got nothing or clearly too little in return").
78.

UNiF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 378 (2006).

79. See Clark, supra note 75, at 505 (noting, in the context of comparing fraudulent transfer
with the doctrines of equitable subordination and veil piercing, "[t]he near absence of sustained
discussion in cases or in the writings of commentators of the relationships among these branches of
the law").
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of fraudulent transfer law.80 From his broad survey of fraudulent transfer
case law, Clark divined what he called four "normative ideals of
fraudulent conveyance law": Truth, Respect, Evenhandedness, and
Nonhindrance.81 Truth he explained as the principle that a debtor may
not deceive his creditor in a manner that will lead to the impairment of
the creditor's claims.8 2 This ideal is closely related to, or perhaps even
identical with, the familiar common law understanding of frauddeceptive acts the reliance on which will tend to harm another. Thus a
debtor may not lie about the assets he owns and which could be used to
satisfy his debt in the event of nonpayment. This norm is without doubt
a part of fraudulent transfer law. Indeed its connection with the
traditional doctrine of fraud likely gave fraudulent transfer its name. Our
investigation is not mainly concerned with a manager's deceptive acts,
however, but rather with the kinds of dispositions a manager openly and
honestly should choose. Similarly Clark's norm of Evenhandednessthat a debtor should not prefer one creditor over another when the debtor
is nearly insolvent-is of little present interest, whatever its general
validity as a principle of fraudulent transfer law.83
More important for present purposes are the ideals of Respect and
Nonhindrance. Respect stands for the principle that a debtor must give
"primacy" to the interests of contract and tort creditors, "as opposed to
the interests of self, family, friends, shareholders, and shrewder or more
powerful bargaining parties." 84 Nonhindrance is a "vague" ideal
prohibiting acts which make the creditor's collection more difficult than
it might otherwise be.8 s In illustration, Clark says that Nonhindrance
prohibits a debtor from converting liquid assets such as cash into illiquid
assets more difficult to attach.
Taken at their limit these ideals have radical implications. They
would mean that a debtor is obliged to subordinate all affection for
80. Id.
Apart from quoted material, I follow the National Conference of
81. Id. at 506.
Commissioners of Uniform State Law in using "fraudulent transfer" in place of the older phrase,
"fraudulent conveyance." See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, Prefatory Note. 7A U.L.A. 5
(2006).
82. Clark, supra note 75, at 509.
83. Id. at 512. Whether Evenhandedness is a real principle of debtor-creditor law is arguable.
Modem preference law may be thought to embody it, but one suspects that preference law is
designed primarily to ward off the threat of kickback. It is not necessary here to decide.
84. Id.at510-11.
85. Id. at 513.
86. Id. at 512-13.
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himself or his family or, critical to modem corporate cases, for
shareholders, to the interests of the creditor." Surely, though, this is not
what the law of fraudulent transfer demands. The question is in what
kinds of situations a debtor must prefer his creditor over himself or other
favored groups. To answer this question, a return to first principles will
be profitable. Intuitions about base cases will do much to clarify the
meaning of fraudulent transfer.
Start with a simple case. Suppose A is a shepherd. He owns a flock
of sheep worth $300 and owes his creditor, B, $200. Hoping to stiff B, A
decides to gift the sheep to his friend, C, leaving A insolvent and unable
fully to satisfy B's claim. C, not being in the business of animal
husbandry and because of his fondness for A, allows A to continue
tending for the flock. When B reduces his claim to judgment and directs
the sheriff to levy on the sheep, A and C resist. They contend that the
sheep do not belong to A and therefore cannot be used to satisfy B's
judgment.
These facts present a clear-cut case of fraudulent transfer. B will be
permitted to avoid the transfer and take possession. All will agree on
that. But what is the wrong? What about the gift hurts B? Ordinarily
the owner of property may dispose of it as he pleases. Why not here?
One view has it that the transfer is wrongful because it was secretly done.
A continued in possession of the sheep after divesting himself of
ownership, making it look as though he continued to hold valuable
assets. The problem is one of apparent ownership. Had he not been
deceived, B might have done more to protect the value of his claim. The
transfer is improper because it violates Clark's ideal of Truth.
The elegant simplicity of this view has sowed a great deal of
confusion and has led some to take a very narrow view of fraudulent
transfer, making it merely a species of fraud or misrepresentation." But

87. Such a rule would replicate the norm of creditor privilege.
88. Students of debtor-creditor law will recognize this hypothetical as a slightly altered version
of the facts of Twyne's Case, (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber), the fountainhead of
fraudulent transfer law and the origin of the badges of fraud. On the reported facts of the real
Twyne's Case, the transferee was not only a friend but also a creditor of the transferor, making the
transfer an example of what today would be known as a voidable preference rather than a fraudulent
transfer. Id at 810.
89. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 6, at 1324 n.5 (arguing that corporate duties to creditors be
limited to "constraints arising in contract and tort," and thus excluding "fraudulent behavior" from
discussion). C.f Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs., 419 F.3d 594, 600 (2005) ("The
doctrine of 'fraudulent conveyance' has specific elements ... that differ from normal usages of the
word 'fraud' .... ).
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in truth, the injury to B has little to do with deception. To see this one
need alter the facts only slightly. Assume that B reduces his claim to
judgment before A gifts the flock to C. Assume even that A notifies B of
the transfer and tells him that B's judgment is the very reason for the
transfer. It matters not at all to B, who has his judgment in hand, whether
A's gift is secret or notorious. A secret transfer might of course fool a
potential subsequent lender, D, who naturally would gather that the sheep
could be used to back any credit he might extend. But for B that is
neither here nor there. B is upset only because the transfer has reduced
the recovery he can expect to make on A's assets. A transfer need not be
done in secret to be fraudulent.
It might be tempting, then, to say that a transfer "hinders, delays, or
defrauds" a creditor if it reduces the creditor's expected recovery on his
claim. Yet fraudulent transfer will not cover such a vast set of cases.
Suppose a shepherd, E, who in all respects is identical to A except that E
has $100 in cash in addition to his flock. E finds that he can use the cash
to buy additional sheep. He reasonably believes that, between his
expertise and economies of scale, he can turn the $100 into sheep worth
$110. He also knows, of course, that sheep die-sometimes prematurely.
Thus, there is a risk that his investment will evaporate. But disease is
reasonably uncommon. E estimates less than a one-in-ten chance that a
plague will strike his flock. Taking the risk into account he expects a
purchase to net $5. As in the hypothetical above, however, the creditor B
is unhappy about the prospect of more sheep. If E holds the $100 in
cash, B is certain he will be able to satisfy a judgment if E should fail to
pay the interest due. But if E converts legal tender into livestock, there is
a ten percent chance the debt will be impaired. Just as in the prototypical
case of fraudulent transfer, E's transfer-of cash, in this case-reduces
B's expected recovery on his claim. The injury to B is the same. 90 Yet
as the reader will predict, E's acquisition of sheep is not a fraudulent
transfer.9 1
This hypothetical suggests something that is missing from Clark's
account of fraudulent transfer. According to Clark's ideal of Respect,
and perhaps too that of Nonhindrance, E's purchase of additional sheep
90. The magnitude of the harm is less, but that is a consequence of the arbitrary numbers
chosen to illustrate the cases.
91. Of course the purchase would be a breach of contract if E had promised B not to dispose of
his cash in this manner. Covenants are enforceable. But to get to the root of the problem of how a
debtor may exercise his residual discretion, we should assume that B is a general creditor not owed
any special right in this regard.
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ought to be condemned.9 2 Recall that Respect stands for the idea that a
debtor must give primacy to the claims of creditors over his own interests
or the interests of his family, friends, or objects of charity. 9 3 According
to Clark, then, E should forget about buying sheep as soon as he realizes
that to do so will reduce the value of B's claim against him. 94 That is the
meaning of primacy. One can see where the absolute nature of Clark's
vision leads. If the creditor's interest is to be preferred to that of the
debtor, then the debtor ought to do whatever he can to maximize the
creditor's return, irrespective of the social costs (including the costs to
himself). It is a rule under which debtors can engage only in Paretoefficient transactions. But fraudulent transfer requires no such thing. It
does not give creditors veto power over all debtor transactions.
The distinction between these hypotheticals is the key to a credible
theory of fraudulent transfer. It is a simple distinction and one which
shows Clark to be near the truth. In both hypotheticals, the transfer
reduced the value of B's claim against the debtor. The distinction is the
expected effect of the transfers on the debtor's wealth relative to their
expected effect on the creditor's wealth. In the case of the gift of sheep,
the expected value of A's assets, to A, increased by an amount equal
exactly to the expected impairment of B's interest. 95 In the case of the
sheep purchase, on the other hand, the expected value of E's assets, to E,
increased by more than the diminution in value of B's claim.
The ideals of Respect and Nonhindrance must be restated. A debtor
need not prefer his creditor to himself, but nor can he prefer himself
unless by so doing he increases the aggregate value of his assets to both
himself and his creditor.96 Put differently, a transfer "hinders, delays or
defrauds" an existing creditor if and only if it will reduce his existing
creditor's expected recovery without increasing the expected value to

92. Clark, supranote 75, at 510-11.
93. Id.
94. Presumably Clark would permit E to pay B the amount by which he thinks acquiring the
sheep would impair B, in expectation. In this sense Clark's rule comes very close to, or is even
identical with, the proposals to forbid debtors from taking any action which would not be Pareto
superior. Id.
95. This assumes that A's friend, C, will allow A to exercise effective right over the sheepi.e., without paying rent. If C were to charge rent, the increased value to A of the sheep would be
less than the decrease in their value to B.
96. See Clark, supra note 75, at 511 n. 19 (analogizing the ideal of Respect to a corporate
director's duty to "avoid abusive self-dealing and other conduct which puts his own interests, or that
of a particular group of shareholders, above the interests of the shareholders as a whole").
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himself and his creditor, combined, of the debtor's assets.
One caveat regarding creditor expectations is in order. When a
creditor implicitly or explicitly ratifies his debtor's transfer of assets, the
transfer is not fraudulent against him. Suppose, for example, that our
friend the shepherd is short on cash but sees an opportunity to turn a
profit if only he could buy additional livestock. He turns to B for a loan
of the $50 he needs to make the purchase and explains what he hopes to
do with the proceeds. Now, however, the likelihood of disease is in
some doubt. It may be that the purchase of additional sheep is a negative
expected-value proposition. Buying the sheep, that is, might violate the
rule just now stated-one cannot be sure. Nevertheless, B will have no
claim of fraudulent transfer. The reason is that he knew of the purchase
before he extended the loan. To the extent B believed it was a bad deal,
he could have and should have-and probably did-charge an interest
rate commensurate with the risk he saw in the enterprise. A rule
permitting creditors to challenge known transactions would be

perverse.

99

97. Development during the twentieth century of the rule of "constructive" fraudulent transfer
should be understood as an attempt to catch those transfers most obviously designed to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors in the sense here described. Constructive fraudulent transfer prohibits the
disposition of assets for less than reasonably equivalent value when the transferor is insolvent or
nearly so. E.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §5(a), 7A U.L.A. 129 (2006); See MSKP Oak
Grove, LLC v. Venuto, 875 F. Supp. 2d 426, 438 (D.N.J. 2012) (showing how the judgment creditor
properly alleged constructive fraudulent transfer under New Jersey Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
based on corporation's distributions to shareholders near insolvency). The reader will recall the
significance of the debtor's being near insolvency. It is when the debtor is financially strapped that
he will be most inclined to pursue negative-value propositions that offer hope of a big payout. State
laws prohibiting corporate distributions to shareholders in similar circumstances serve the same
purpose. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 170 (2012) (permitting issuance of dividends only when
a surplus exists).
98. See Clark, supra note 75, at 511 (explaining that a transfer does not violate the ideal of
Truth when the transaction is "fully and truthfully described").
99. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Bankruptcy Code creates an unfortunate
exception upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). The Code
allows the trustee to avoid transfers as though he were a hypothetical creditor without knowledge of
or acquiescence in the transfer, and directs him to share the proceeds of any recovery ratably
according to the priority of allowed claimants' claims. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2012). This rule is
indifferent to the fact that two creditors may have starkly different justifications in challenging a
debtor's transfer as fraudulent. It permits double recovery for creditors who advanced funds
knowing of the challenged transfer and leaves in the cold those who did not. Thus Ijoin the chorus
of commentators who reject the doctrine of Moore. See Douglas J. Whaley, The Dangerous
Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 82 TEX. L. REv. 73, 74 (2003) ("The villain is the doctrine of Moore v.
Bay, which ... allows the bankruptcy trustee to assume the rights of the [unsecured creditors] ...
and then to improve their priority position by fitting into it all claims filed in the [debtor's]
bankruptcy proceeding, thus exhausting the value of the collateral and squeezing out the junior
perfected creditors.").
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Let us return to the question of how a manager ought to dispose of
firm assets in the face of vertical investor conflict and ask what
fraudulent transfer teaches. As we have seen, the traditional account of
fiduciary duty asks the manager to maximize the return of assets to the
firm's shareholders. 00 When the firm is financially healthy, this means
finding projects that increase the expected value of the firm's assets. But
when the firm is financially distressed-when its debt-to-assets ratio
approaches 1-the manager can maximize shareholder returns through
projects that entail negative expected value but also a high variance of
returns. This is the lesson of Part II. Fraudulent transfer doctrine
constrains the manager. Another way to put the point is to say that the
shareholder-wealth maximization norm is subject to the constraint of
fiduciary duty. The manager must seek to maximize shareholder returns
subject to the rule that he may not accomplish this aim by reducing the
net expected value of the assets to the shareholders and creditors
combined. In other words, the manager may seek to profit shareholders
only by undertaking positive expected-value projects. In choosing
between two mutually exclusive projects, one with a high expected value
that, because of the variance of its payouts, will impair creditors, and one
that is safe but with a low expected value, the manager can and should
choose the high-risk, high-value project.
The logic implies a reciprocal rule. Suppose now that the high-value
project is also the safe one and that the low-value project would benefit
shareholders only because of its risk properties. Fraudulent transfer
forbids the manager from choosing the risky, low-value project. The
manager must in this case choose the project favored by the creditors.
The synthesis of the two rules states an ideal of asset-value
maximization. The manager ought to employ the firm's assets in a way
that maximizes their aggregate value to all the firm's investorsshareholders and creditors.
One could object that fraudulent transfer touches only transfers and
never condemns the status quo. Fraudulent transfer, that is, never
obliges a debtor firm actively to do anything with its assets. The firm
need not reduce the risk its operations entail just because a higher-value
project is available. Although such an action-inaction distinction is well
taken on formal grounds, it cannot have much to say about the world of

100. Bo Becker & Per Strdmberg, FiduciaryDuties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts, 25 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1931, 1931 (2012). See also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(extending directors' fiduciary duty only to shareholders).
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modem business. In the business world there is formally speaking no
status quo. The most routine operations are accomplished through
countless "transfers" within the meaning of any conveyance law.
The skeptical reader will notice another question of baseline, one that
at first glance appears more sophisticated. Suppose that a highly
leveraged firm faces three mutually exclusive possibilities. First, it may
pursue its status quo portfolio of projects. Second, it can undertake a
project that in expectation promises to net the firm $10 more than the
status quo but that will entail a high variance of possible returns. Third,
the firm can choose a project that guarantees $15 more than the status
quo portfolio. It should by now be clear enough that the firm's manager
is obliged to do something other than the status quo. But must he choose
the third (highest value) project? Our discussion of fraudulent transfer
concluded that a debtor is permitted to impair creditor interests if in so
doing the debtor increases the expected value of its assets)'or If the
appropriate baseline is the status quo, then the second project is
acceptable, and, according to our traditional statement of fiduciary duty,
the manager should choose it if it maximizes the shareholders' expected
return. But suppose the manager in fact chooses this high-variance
project. Now the low-value, high-risk project becomes the status quo.
The problem dissolves into the binary choice described above. Setting
aside the action-inaction distinction, the manager will be obliged to trade
up, so to speak, to the highest-value project.

In the real world, of course, the expected values of a firm's
opportunities are difficult or perhaps impossible to determine with
precision. It is even doubtful to what extent an outsider can know what
opportunities the firm realistically has. The law's response has been to
defer in most cases to the judgments of a firm's management. When
shareholders sue and assert a violation of fiduciary obligation, this
discretion is known as the business judgment rule. When a creditor
objects to a firm's disposition of assets on a theory of fraudulent transfer,
discretion is embodied in the rule that the creditor must prove intent to
delay, hinder, or defraud. By definition, deference means that often law
will not discipline a manager who flouts the asset-value-maximization

101.

See supra notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text.
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norm.
This Part has aimed to abstract from the real world-to forget for a
moment the evidentiary burdens and presumptions that color real-world
litigation-and to discern what the law directs a conscientious manager
to do. Undoubtedly most managers care what the law says, just because
it is law, about how they ought to exercise their discretion. Anyone who
stops at red lights in the middle of the night will understand why. And
empirical work suggests that manager behavior does in fact change when
the standard of conduct to which they are held changes, even when the
threat of successful challenges in litigation is held constant.' 0 2 Think of
this as a function of law's expressive value.
Expressive value is only a part of the matter, though. Business
managers are no saints. Accepting that managers will inevitably enjoy
some latitude because of the real-world limitations of courts (and the
costs of judicial intervention),o one needs to ask whether an
interventionist program is justifiable; and, if so, under what conditions.
IV. THE PROSPECT OF LEGAL INTERVENTION

The lesson of Parts II and III can be summarized neatly. The law
asks a firm's manager to resolve vertical investor conflict by pursuing
projects likely to maximize the expected value of the firm's assets to
shareholders and creditors combined. In some circumstances, assetvalue maximization will be the manager's natural aim. When the
manager's private profit identity is equally weighted between
shareholder and creditor interest, she will seek value-maximizing
projects without any legal intervention.104 But with anything short of a
complete theory of human behavior, one can estimate the manager's
profit identity with only very limited accuracy. It is safe to presume that
the manager will be inclined to a more risk-neutral. strategy than either
the firm's shareholders or its creditors will be, but it is not obvious
102. See Becker & Str6mberg, supra note 100, at 1932-34 (showing changes in managerial
behavior in firms near insolvency following Credit Lyonnais). Credit Lyonnais told managers to
consider creditor as well as shareholder interests "in the vicinity of insolvency," but it did not
articulate any standard by which creditors might enforce this new obligation. Nevertheless, Becker
and Strtmberg have identified significant changes in firm behavior after Credit Lyonnais. In
particular, they found that firms reduced risk, increased leverage, and relied less on explicit
covenants. Id
103. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1313 (discussing the inability of courts to easily or
effectively determine the legality of a director's actions).
104. See supra Part 1.B.
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except in the extreme case whether the manager will pursue a riskseeking or a risk-averse strategy. That is, it is not obvious as a matter of
theory whether the manager's deviation from the legal norm is more
likely to state a case of fiduciary slack or fraudulent transfer. In
particular, the existence of a dissatisfied shareholder or creditor class
reveals little about the degree to which the manager has departed from
the risk-neutral attitude the law directs. Inasmuch as the manager's
apparent risk tolerance will generally be intermediate, one should expect
that both shareholders and creditors will be unhappy with it to some
degree. 05
A costless mechanism to enforce asset-value maximization would
reduce managerial bonding costs as well as the monitoring costs of both
debt and equity. It would thus decrease firms' total cost of capital. But
if the most one can say of managerial incentives is that they are
ambiguous, it is natural to ask how law could possibly ameliorate vertical
investor conflict at acceptable cost. Litigation is expensive. Without a
stable presumption about the direction in or degree to which management
is likely to depart from the value-maximizing norm, litigation would
seem to threaten significant error costs in addition to unavoidable
administrative costs.
Moreover, a coherent evaluation of law's place in resolving vertical
investor conflict depends on one's view of capital markets' relative
efficiency. Investors are well aware of conflicts between hierarchically
differentiated capital suppliers. Given the inherent costs of litigation,
one must ask whether investors can solve conflicts more cheaply than
courts. And to the extent markets have eschewed an apparent resolution
to the problem, one needs to ask why. Solutions entail costs. If the costs
of eradicating an evident problem exceed the costs of the problem itself,
then the solution is itself a new problem. Indeed, decisions such as
Credit Lyonnais and Gheewalla are probably best read as an implicit
ratification of this skeptical view. In directing managerial loyalty to a
"community of interests," Delaware has effectively denied that there is
any particular metric by which courts can assess a manager's deviation
from the ideal, value-maximizing attitude. Without a standard of
evaluation, the business judgment rule takes on nearly insuperable
proportions. Laissez faire seems to be Delaware's doctrine when it

105. Laura Lin pointed out this difficulty with respect to creditor challenges. Lin, supra note 8,
at 1509. But for reasons that should by now be clear, a shareholder's incentive to challenge valuemaximizing projects is equal to and reciprocal of a creditor's.
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comes to vertical investor conflict.
But is it true that law is generally incapable of encouraging selfinterested managers to live up to the value-maximization ideal? Broadly
speaking, the law might seek to resolve vertical investor conflict through
either ex ante or ex post regulation, or through a combination of both. Ex
ante regulation seeks to align the incentives of primary actors with the
social good. Here that means a strategy aimed at making investors and
managers prefer asset-value maximizing projects. Ex post regulation
seeks the same end, but does so by threat of punishment for deviation
from the ideal norm. It is regulation by litigation. This Part tentatively
argues that ex ante legal intervention holds little promise. With respect
to litigation, this Part argues that Delaware's skeptical attitude is well
taken in the context of closely held firms, but that deference to
management is less justified when investors in a public firm allege
breach of fiduciary obligation or fraudulent transfer.
A. Ex Ante Regulation
1. Harmonizing Investor Incentives
As we saw in Part II, vertical investor conflict is a function of limited
liability and in particular the hierarchical nature of investors' claims on
firm assets. One way in which law can resolve this conflict is through
rules harmonizing investor profit identities. Reducing the divergence of
interest between shareholders and creditors reduces the effect of risk on
the expected profit of each. Reducing the effect of risk in turn reduces
the investors' incentives to lobby management for low expected-value
projects that redound to the particular class's advantage. To take an
extreme possibility, imagine that shareholders and creditors were made
to internalize identical profit identities, in the case of a dual-class firm
each class bearing half of the other's losses. This would solve vertical
investor conflict outright because it would make the investors' cash-flow
rights identical.
One example of a harmonizing rule found in our law is forced
conversion. In a bona fide Chapter 11 reorganization, the bankruptcy
judge is empowered to convert a creditor's prepetition debt interest in the
debtor firm into an equity interest in the reorganized entity.106 If need be,
106. See In re AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
bankruptcy court can consider whether to characterize a claim of debt as equity).
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the bankruptcy judge can accomplish this through "cram down,"l07 and
thus negotiations during bankruptcy reflect the possibility of at least
partial conversion. Even before bankruptcy, therefore, the threat of
conversion affects a rational creditor's profit identity. If the creditor
thinks there is a 30 percent chance of conversion into equity tomorrowor, what comes to the same thing, if the creditor believes that 30 percent
of his interest will be converted-then his own profit identity will reflect
shareholders' interests proportionally. This creditor will be marginally
less likely, pre-bankruptcy, to agitate for value-destroying safe projects.
Commentators who advocate a loss "sharing" regime, rather than a
presumption of liquidation and distribution according to state law
priorities, have in fact sought (perhaps unwittingly) a rule ameliorating
vertical investor conflict. 08
But although robust conversion rules have the potential to eliminate
vertical investor conflict, one should be wary of their place in debtorcreditor law. Conversion rules reduce conflict because they flatten a
firm's capital structure. Creditors in a world of robust conversion are
less likely to seek safe, low-value projects because they know that, at the
end of the day, only a fraction of their priority will be respected.
Shareholders in such a world know that they bear the residual interest
only to a degree. In terms of cash-flow rights, the investors become
homogeneous; at the limit, they find themselves in a world of equity-only
or debt-only firms.
Yet notwithstanding vertical investor conflict and Modigliani and
Miller's famous riddle,' 0 9 capital markets continue to generate
hierarchically differentiated capital structures. Financial economists and
legal scholars have identified a number of plausible explanations. For
one thing, hierarchical differentiation may optimize the monitoring of a
firm's management." 0 It may, in other words, reduce managerial selfdealing by more than the expected cost of vertical investor conflict. One
has to be skeptical of legal rules that undermine the choices voluntary
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012).
108. E.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 775 (1987). Interestingly,
bankruptcy law is asymmetric in its appetite for conversion. A creditor's interest may be converted,
but not a shareholder's. In other words, the bankruptcy judge cannot call on shareholders for
additional capital-a forced "loan" that would to some degree force shareholders to internalize
lenders' losses.
109. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 268-69 (1958) (establishing the theory that a firm's
form of capital financing is irrelevant to its market value).
110. See, Levmore, supranote 36, at 50.
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investors make.
To say that law has no place here is not to diminish the insight that
conversion-indeed, even the possibility of conversion-reduces vertical
investor conflict. Financial economists have suggested that firms use
convertible instruments for precisely this reason."' This is a voluntary
rather than mandatory conversion rule, but the incentive dynamic works
similarly. And indeed, empirical research suggests that financially
troubled firms (in which vertical investor conflict is most acute) are more
likely than others to issue convertible bonds.112 The point is rather that
law with its one-size-fits-all tendency is unlikely to do better than private
markets in creating optimal conversion rights.
A different harmonizing rule would unify investor interests by
forcing auction to a single buyer whenever a firm's debt-to-assets ratio
exceeds an identifiable threshold."' 3 Recall that the sole owner of assets
maximizes his profit by maximizing asset value.114 In large measure,
modem bankruptcy practice is devoted to this aim. Whether through a
section 363 sale or by the terms of a plan of reorganization, most Chapter
11 proceedings are resolved by putting the debtor's assets in the hands of
a single, willing buyer.115 Even when a debtor firm does not sell all of its
assets, it often sells a portion of them to generate cash, pay down debt
claims, and thereby restore the firm's debt-to-assets ratio to an

111. Jensen and Meckling were the first to see this. According to their pathbreaking article,
"[T]he addition of a conversion privilege to fixed claims such as debt or preferred stock would also
tend to reduce the incentive effects of the existence of such fixed claims and therefore lower the
agency costs associated with them." Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 354. See also Smith &
Warner, supra note 28, at 140-42 (discussing Jensen and Meckling's work and noting that not all
debt contracts include a conversion privilege due to the accompanying expenses); but see M. P.
Narayanan, On the Resolution ofAgency Problems by Complex FinancialInstruments: A Comment,

42 J.FIN. 1083, 1087-88 (1987) (taking issue with the argument that conversion necessarily resolves
vertical investor conflict).
112.

Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, Capital Structure and Debt Structure, 23 REv. FIN. STUD.

4242, 4245 (2010); Michael J. Brennan & Eduardo S. Schwartz, The Case for Convertibles, 1 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 64 (1988).

113. In many respects such a rule would serve the same purpose as minimum-capital
requirements pervasive in the European Union. In the United States, however, minimum-capital
rules are unrealistic outside heavily regulated industries such as banking and insurance. For a
persuasive argument against the utility of minimum-capital rules, even if they were politically
feasible, see Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case
Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165 (2001).
114. See supra Part H.A.
115. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.

673, 679 (2003) (finding that in2002 84% of Chapter 11 proceedings were asset sales or preexisting
deals).
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acceptable level." 6 One might describe Chapter 11 as standing for a de
facto if not dejure mandatory-auction principle.
For at least two reasons, though, one should hesitate at the prospect
of a mandatory-auction rule. First, asset sales collapse the option value
inherent in the junior interests." 7 One can think of an asset sale as a
zero-risk investment, and thus as the kind of project for which creditors
will agitate even (in some cases) where the assets' value to the firm is
greater than what the highest outside bidder will pay. In a world of
asymmetric information, this may often be the case." 8 The concern is
that investors in a mandatory-auction regime will act strategically on the
margins near whatever debt-to-assets threshold the law might select." 9
Creditors, in particular, may perversely seek negative returns in the short
run in order to activate the mandatory auction. For their part,
shareholders might seek short-run measures that decrease the firm's
immediate debt-to-assets ratio at the expense of long-run growth
opportunities.120
To some degree capital markets appear willing to tolerate the
perversion of incentives associated with a forced sale. In many debt
contracts, firms covenant not to allow their debt-equity ratio to grow
beyond a stated threshold. The creditor of a breaching firm then has the
option to declare a default and force the firm into bankruptcy where an
asset sale is likely.121 Again, though, one must ask why the law should
intervene if investors are capable of crafting mandatory auction rules
where they please.122 Here, the law's inflexibility is of particular
concern. The degree to which vertical investor conflict will pose a real
and not merely theoretical threat to the efficient use of assets will depend
upon factors such as the firm's size and the industry in which the firm
operates. 23 Investors can haggle over details. A statute is, by contrast, a
116. Id. at 675-76, 691-93 (discussing the prevalence and role of asset sales in Chapter 11
proceedings).
117.

Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter

11, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 759, 764-65 (2011).
118. Id.at788.
119. See id. at 784-89 (discussing the conflicting interests of junior and senior creditors when
the mandatory absolute priority rule is applied).
120. Casey argues that bankruptcy can preserve option value in asset sales by relaxing the
absolute-priority rule. Id. at 789-96. Another approach, which I hope to specify in subsequent
research, would require the sale of the investors' interests rather than the firm's assets.
121. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 115, at 679.
122.
123.

See id at 696.
See id.
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blunt tool indeed.
2. Regulating Managerial Incentives
A second approach to ex ante regulation focuses on managerial
incentives. As we have seen, a manager's profit identity is a weighted
average of the profit identities of the firm's investors. In a two-tranche
firm such as Part II modeled, vertical investor conflict threatens to
impose social costs only when the manager's profit identity is not
equally weighted between the interests of shareholders and creditors.
Thus, a legal rule forcing managers to weigh investor interests
proportionally to the size of their claims would alleviate the effects of
investor conflict without seeking to harmonize the investors' own
incentives.
The most obvious route is a legal rule mandating that compensation
be tied to changes in the value of a firm's assets (including assets taken
out of corporate solution as dividends or to pay down debt).12 4 The idea
entails obvious practical difficulties. Firms are financed from many
directions. A firm may owe obligations on a bank loan (including
revolving facilities under which the outstanding amount of debt
fluctuates), multiple bond issues with varying maturities, trade debt with
varying terms, employee contracts, and involuntary, sometimes
contingent and uncertain, tax and tort claims, all in addition to, of course,
equity. Changes in financing would require firms continually to update
compensation contracts. The practical inconvenience may explain, in
part, why we do not observe firms offering such detailed, tailored
compensation packages. But in any event, there is little reason to think
law can achieve more in this regard than private markets can.
In particular, law seems ill-suited to the heterogeneity of managerial
preferences. This Article has assumed throughout that investors and
managers reveal symmetric tolerance for risk. It has been a convenient
assumption for purposes of exposition, but of course people in the real
124. See generally Baird & Henderson, supra note 9 (discussing contractual pay-setting for
managers of firms in Chapter 11); see also Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 352 ("If [the
manager] binds himself contractually to hold a fraction of the total debt equal to his fractional
ownership of the total equity he would have no incentive whatsoever to reallocate wealth from the
debtholders to the stockholders."). Delayed compensation probably does this, as do pension plans.
The idea is to make the manager a kind of "sole owner." If she has to internalize the costs
shareholders' preferences impose on debtholders, and vice versa, in proportion to the size of
investment in each tranche, the manager ought to internalize the social cost of preferring any one
group of investors.
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world differ on this score. Some scholars have theorized that managers
are systematically risk-averse, relative to the suppliers of capital, when it
comes to the firm's activities. 125 Unlike most passive investors, senior
executives are expected and at times required to invest a substantial part
of their personal wealth in the firm. Diversification is more difficult,
perhaps impossible, and consequently management may be inclined to
reduce the variance of the firm's prospects. Others believe that the
personality likely to rise to a position of senior management, at least in a
big firm, tends toward the risk-seeking.12 6 There is no need here to take a
position on which thesis is empirically correct, if either. Whatever the
average direction of managerial risk preferences, there is doubtless
variation among particular managers. If investors, in a given firm,
believe that their CEO is a risk seeker, or is risk averse, they may want to
tailor her compensation package to fit the facts. Law's cumbersome
uniformity is not well adapted to deploy hunches or respond to subtle
behavioral signals.

This discussion should suggest skepticism about the law's ability,
relative to that of capital markets, to resolve vertical investor conflict
through ex ante regulation. The reason is clear enough: wherever the law
can furnish a workable ex ante rule, capital markets can do the same.
And unlike the law, which because of administrative and decision costs
tends to issue one-size-fits-all doctrines, investors in capital markets can
tailor ex ante rules to fit the occasion. The domain of investor conflict
does not seem to be one in which an impartial regulator is better
equipped than self-interested investors who are fully aware of the
problem they face.
B. Ex Post Regulation
Ex post regulation seeks to discipline the manager, to force her to
choose asset-value maximizing projects, by permitting investors to
challenge the legality of her preferred projects. It assigns decisionmaking authority to managers in the first instance. If, however, an
investor can prove that the manager would have selected a different
125.
126.

See supranote 38.
See supranote 38.

46

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

portfolio of projects had she acted with the risk-neutral attitude
associated with socially optimal use of assets, a court may substitute its
own judgment for that of the manager.
As Part III showed, our law currently foresees a measure of this kind
of ex post regulation. Disaffected shareholders can seek to set aside
managerial decisions in a suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty. A
successful claim entitles the shareholder plaintiff to injunctive relief,
directing management to undertake the proper course of action, or else
compensatory damages. 127 Disappointed creditors have an analogous
cause of action. They can challenge managerial decisions in a fraudulent
transfer suit against the debtor firm. Here, too, courts are authorized to
enjoin pending transactions or to set them aside after the fact. 128
We might think investor suits hold little promise of effectively
regulating managerial incentives. The manager's profit identity is
difficult to estimate in any given case, because of uncertainty about the
relative weight she will give to shareholder and creditor interests.
Investors and managers may differ in their estimation of the risks and
rewards of various possible projects, a version of the "balance-sheet"
conflict referred to in Part II. Because it is difficult to estimate a
manager's profit identity in any given case, courts will often be unable to
calibrate a prima facie view of the skepticism with which they evaluate
the manager's actions. In other words, courts may find it hard to tell
whether a manager has adopted a course of action out of favoritism
toward a class of the firm's investors or, rather, because of genuine belief
that it is the asset-value maximizing strategy.
Indeed, courts are well aware of this problem. The deference they
grant to managerial decisions reflects the difficulty.'2 9 Yet it is worth
asking whether deference is in all cases equally merited. For firms
whose securities are widely traded, market prices may provide valuable
insight. To see this, consider again the Acme hypothetical from Part II.
Assume that Acme's equity and debt are traded in liquid markets.
Additionally, assume that the manager and investors know, or at least
agree on, the payout possibilities of Acme's three possible projects, but
that a court is incapable of discovering the information directly. At time

127. E.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 939 (Del. 2003).
128. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 155 (2006).
129. See, e.g., In re Citigroup S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) ("It is
almost impossible for a court, in hindsight, to determine whether the directors of a company properly
evaluated risk and thus made the 'right' business decision.").
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0, Acme's equity is trading for E0 and its debt for Po. Suppose first that
the manager announces that Acme will pursue Project A. Shareholders
are elated. The market reacts to the news by trading up the value of
equity to E0 + $17.50. The creditor, on the other hand, is disappointed.
The market now prices his debt at Po - $37.50. If the creditor files suit
on a fraudulent transfer theory, what result? Consulting the price
fluctuations, the court will see that Acme has reduced the creditor's
expected recovery without increasing the expected value of its assets to
the investors as a group. Before the announcement, the market valued
Acme's assets at E0 + P0 . Now it values them at E0 + Po - 20. This is a

fraudulent transfer.
Note that shareholders would hold a reciprocal and viable complaint
if management selected Project B. The claim would be described as a
breach of the duty of loyalty. Project C presents the interesting case. If
Acme pursues Project C, the market price of shareholders' equity
increases to Eo + $7.50. The price of the creditor's debt declines to Po $2.50. Now what result if the creditor brings a fraudulent transfer
action? The answer is no liability. As in the case of Project A, Acme has
reduced the creditor's expected recovery. But it has done so by choosing
a project that increases the total value of its assets. The market now
values Acme's assets at E0 + P0 - 5. The manager has made a proper

decision.
This hypothetical suggests a more general conclusion. If liquid
markets efficiently price each class of debt and equity a firm issues, then
courts can get a rough sense of the merit of an investor's suit by
comparing prices before and after the announcement of a strategic
initiative.' 30 If the price of the plaintiffs investment has increased, there
is no liability. If the price of the plaintiff's investment has decreased but
the implied price of the assets as a whole has increased, there is no
liability. Only when the price of the plaintiffs investment and the
implied value of the firm's assets have declined in value, but yet the
value of another class of investment has increased, is there cause to think
management favoritism is to blame.' 3' This is not to say liability would
follow as a matter of course in such a case. Maybe the manager has
private information about the risks and rewards of the project she has
130. The court would of course have to extrapolate from market changes to estimate the price
fluctuation of untraded investments such as trade debt and tort claims.
131. Cf Baird & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1326 (suggesting the notion behind Credit
Lyonnais is that a "fiduciary duty owed to shareholders should not prevent the directors from taking
actions that were in the creditors' interest and in the interest of the firm as a whole").
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selected, information necessarily not included in market prices. But here
at least the facts suggest that a deeper inquiry into the manager's motives
may be in order. In a sense, market signals promise to reduce litigation
costs by filtering meritless from potentially meritorious claims.
Market signals may be valuable even where a court lacks access to
the pricing of every class of investment. The only crucial data is the
firm's equity and options on the same trade in a liquid market. Option
theory tells us that the value of an option depends on, among other
things, the underlying asset's volatility. 13 2 Widely used pricing models
such as Black-Scholes reveal the implied volatility of equity (the square
of equity's variance). 3 3 Comparing the implied volatility of a firm's
equity before and after the announcement of a strategic initiative thus
reveals the market's evaluation of the change in its volatility attributable
to the announced plan. As Part II showed, shareholders' and creditors'
profit identities depend on both the expected value of the firm's projects
and their variance. A change in the price of equity reflects a change in
(a) the expected value of the firm's assets, (b) the expected variance
inherent in the firm's business, or (c) both. Using an option pricing
model to estimate variance, one can mechanically calculate whether, to
what degree, and in what direction these factors contributed to changes in
the value of an investment. Deriving variance from changes in option
prices is in some ways more complicated than direct observation. But it
would allow mathematically inclined courts to screen meritless cases
where not all of a firm's debt and equity trade in liquid markets.
The skeptical reader may again object that this discussion assumes a
stable baseline against which managerial decisions are to be judged.
Suppose that a firm faces three possible strategic initiatives: the status
quo and two alternatives, one of which entails high risk and one low risk.
Although both of the alternative projects will in expectation increase the
value of the firm's assets relative to the status quo, one is more valuable
than the other. How, the skeptic might ask, will investor suits direct the
manager toward the highest-value project? Capital markets will in either
case reflect an increase in the value of the firm's assets, and thus, the

132. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. FinancialServices Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation,and IncreasedRisks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 343 (2002)
(stating that an underlying asset's "anticipated volatility" is one of several factors influencing the
value of an option).
133. See id ("The Black-Scholes model simplifies the problem of estimating volatility .....
See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricingof Options and CorporateLiabilities, 81
J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
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objection goes, courts would find liability in neither case. The manager
has free reign.
The significance of the skeptic's objection turns on one's view of the
efficiency of capital markets. If market prices at time 0 do not accurately
reflect the firm's possible projects in addition to its status quo operations,
then prices will only imperfectly signal managerial malfeasance. Highly
efficient markets price information quickly and accurately. Anyone who
watches the ticker tape after a firm announces quarterly results knows
that markets do indeed price public information quickly. It is less
obvious that they price private information accurately. Suppose a firm's
CEO is considering whether to undertake a project, call it Y. At the same
time, she learns of a prospective business deal, Z, the firm could reach
with another company. Z would make the firm a handsome profit, in
expectation, but it would also entail high risk. Because her interests are
roughly aligned with the interests of senior creditors, the CEO keeps
quiet about Z and goes forward with the less profitable Y. Or she may
misrepresent her real views about Z's profitability. To the extent markets
are bad at determining what possibilities are reasonably available, they
will be relatively unhelpful to a court's assessment of malfeasance in an
investor suit.
These are credible concerns. It should be stressed that market data
will not costlessly resolve investor suits. They will not resolve vertical
investor conflict perfectly. Yet in the case of a firm with widely traded
securities, market prices can tell us something about whether a manager
has consciously changed the firm's risk profile, and whether the change
is likely to have increased or decreased the expected value of the firm's
assets.
The close firm presents a less sanguine view of the promise of
judicial intervention. By definition, investments in a close firm are not
widely traded. Courts do not have access to the opinions disinterested
market watchers hold on the nature of managerial decisions. The say-so
of interested investors is the best evidence a judge will realistically hear.
We have seen that a manager's risk appetite at a given time is likely to be
greater than a creditor's but less than a shareholder's. The manager's
choice of projects will tend to entail too much risk for the creditor but too
little for the shareholder. Both classes of investor could gripe. Indeed, in
a distressed firm, socially optimal investments satisfy neither shareholder
nor creditor. The existence of dispute then says nothing about whether
and to what extent a manager has deviated from the decisional ideal our
law supplies. Short of damning documentary evidence, courts will find it
difficult to figure what exactly caused a manager's decision. In a close
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firm, ex post regulation through investor suits seems an unhelpful way to
resolve investor conflict.
On the other hand, the deleterious social effects of conflict are
perhaps less significant in a close firm. The investors in a close firm are
fewer in number than investors in a public corporation. They are also
likely on average to know more about the firm's business. The
freeriding problem is smaller and hence the returns to active monitoring
are greater. In this sense the close firm approaches a rough description
of Coase's utopia. Holdout and freerider problems are small, as are the
costs of negotiation. Information asymmetries are few and far between.
The investors can cheaply negotiate with one another or bribe
management. Their ex post dickering predictably ends with the firm
putting its assets to their best use. Thus, as in so many places, Coase
comes to the rescue when the situation appeared most dire.
V. CONCLUSION

Vertical conflict is not a sign of perverse or idiosyncratic investor
behavior. On the contrary, it is a product of rational self-interest in the
presence of limited liability. Wherever investor claims to a firm's assets
are hierarchically organized, vertical investor conflict should be expected
and socially suboptimal use of assets should be feared. The question is
what, if anything, law has to say about the way in which managers
resolve the conflict.
This Article has aimed to show that our law has much to say, at least
when it comes to articulating ideals toward which managers should
strive. The combined lesson of fraudulent transfer doctrine and the duty
of loyalty, as traditionally framed, is that a manager ought to seek
strategies that maximize the expected value of her firm's assets. This is a
descriptive take on the law, but it has the happy consequence of
mirroring the rule that most economists believe investors would agree to
in a hypothetical, ex ante negotiation. In this sense, asset-value
maximization can be understood as a default norm of corporate and
debtor-creditor law.
Whether law can do much good enforcing the norm is a harder
question. I suspect that one's conclusion on this score will depend on
one's priors about the efficiency with which and manner in which capital
markets speak to vertical investor conflict. Tailored compensation
packages, coupled with the threat (or promise) of takeover by a single
owner, may go far in remedying the problem. But market regulation
appears imperfect. To those who believe that prices do a good job of
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reflecting the underlying state of affairs in a firm, suits charging violation
of fiduciary obligation or fraudulent transfer may seem a valuable
complement.
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